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A Step By Step Look at UARG v. EPA: A New
Layer of Greenhouse Gas Regulation
Kevin 0. Leske*
ABSTRACT
Hailed by many as the most important environmental law decision,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA held that greenhouse
gases (GHGs) are "airpollutants" that the United State Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) can regulate under the federal Clean Air Act
(CAA). This groundbreakingconclusion soon led EPA to promulgate a
series of related GHG regulations to address climate change. The
cascading effect of the Supreme Court's holding in Massachusetts that
GHGs were covered by the Clean Air Act, however, remained to be
seen.
One pivotal question was whether EPA's post-Massachusetts
promulgation of GHG emission standardsfor new motor-vehicles, in
turn, requiredEPA to also regulate certain stationarysources of GHG
emissions, such as power plants, industrial sources, as well as even
smaller non-industrial sources, like small businesses and apartment
buildings. And if the CAA did not compel EPA to regulate these
sources, was EPA allowed to do so as a matter of its discretion under
the CAA?
The Supreme Court, however, in UARG v. EPA has now resolved
many of these questions that lingered in the wake of the Massachusetts
v. EPA decision. Accordingly, this Article examines the very recent case
of UARG v. EPA, which was decided by the Court in June of 2014.
It first gives a very brief background on greenhouse gases and
climate change, as well as sets forth the provisions of the federal Clean
Air Act at issue. The Article then summarizes the Supreme Court's
foundational holding in Massachusetts v. EPA that EPA has the
authority to regulate GHGs under the CAA to address climate change.
. Associate Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law. I would like to thank
Caleb Knepper for his terrific research assistance and work on this Article, as well as
EELJ Editor in Chief Michelle Gregory for her excellent work on this Article. I also
am grateful to Dean Leticia Diaz for her support.
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Next, it addresses the key challenge to EPA's post-Massachusetts
authority to regulate GHGs by exploring the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit's decision in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v.
EPA, where the court rejected various petitioners' attempts to derail
EPA's ambitious and creative plan to cut GHGs emissions from both
mobile and stationarysources.
The Article then details the Supreme Court's June 2014 decision in
UARG v. EPA. Specifically, it examines Justice Scalia's opinion on
behalfof a majority of the Court; Justice Breyer's opinion concurringin
part and dissenting in part; and Justice Alito's opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part. Finally, the last section of the Article then
analyzes the potential impact of the Court's opinions, concluding that
the decision is an important step forward in developing comprehensive
greenhouse gas regulation.
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I. BACKGROUND
A.

GREENHOUSE GASES AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Greenhouse gases (GHG) refer to gases that act "like the ceiling of
a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the escape of reflected
heat" when released into the atmosphere.1 Anthropocentric sources of
GHGs emissions are widespread; "cars, power plants, and industrial
2
sites all release significant amounts of these heat-trapping gases."
Carbon dioxide has been called "the most important species" of a
greenhouse gas3 , as well as "[a] well-documented rise in global
temperatures has coincided with a significant increase in the
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.",4 Many respected
scientists are convinced that the "two trends are related" and that
anthropocentric GHG emissions are the dominant factor in this climate
change. 5 Global climate change is predicted to "cause a host of
deleterious consequences, including brought, increasingly severe
weather events, and rising sea levels." 6
B. THE FEDERAL CLEANAIR ACT
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (CAA) "to protect and enhance
the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population., 7 As
part of its 1970 "overhaul" of the CAA, Congress was especially
concerned about "the growth in the amount and complexity of air
pollution brought about by urbanization, industrial development, and the
increasing use of motor vehicles," which "has resulted in mounting
dangers to the public health and welfare." 8
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007).
2

Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 114 (D.C.

Cir. 2012).
3 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 504-505.
4
5

See id. at 504-505.
See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 505; Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc.

v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
6

Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 114 (D.C.

Cir. 2012).
7

Gen. Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990).

8

42 U.S.C. §7401(a)(2) (2013). See Brief for Federal Respondents at 6.
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To address these issues, the CAA sets as a goal the "reduction or
elimination, through any measures, of the amount of pollutants produced
or created at the source." 9 The CAA, however, regulates mobile sources
of pollution (such as cars and trucks) differently than stationary sources
(such as power plants and factories).10 At issue in this case are the
stationary source permitting requirements mandated by the CAA under
Title I and Title V. 11
1. Title I of the CAA
Under Title I, the EPA must establish National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for air pollutants. 12 As of 2014, six
pollutants (sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, nitrogen dioxide, carbon
monoxide, ozone, and lead) are considered "criteria" pollutants that
have corresponding NAAQS. 13 These NAAQS are for the most part
achieved through "State implementation plans" (SIPs), which, as their
name suggests, are designed by states. 14 In designing their SIPS, states
are required to classify all areas within their borders as either being: (1)
9
10

42 U.S.C. §7401(a)(3).
Title II of the CAA regulates air pollution from motor vehicles and other

mobile sources. 42 U.S.C. §7521-7590 (2013). Generally speaking, EPA under Title II
is required to establish vehicle standards for air pollutants that it determines "may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C §7521(a)(1).
Title I, on the other hand, contains several programs that regulate stationary sources of
air pollution, including power plants and other industries. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §74707479 (2013) (Title I's Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program), 42
U.S.C. §7411 (2013) (Title I's New Source Performance Standards), 42 U.S.C. §75017515 (2013) (Title I's Nonattainment New Source Review permitting program). See
Brief for Federal Respondents at 6-8.
i
See, 42 U.S.C. §7470 et seq. (Title I's Prevention of Significant Deterioration
(PSD) program); 42 U.S.C. §7661 (2013) et seq. (Title V's permitting program). See,
generally, UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272 (U.S. June 23, 2014), Slip Op. at 2-4.
12 42 U.S.C. §§7408 7409 (2013).
13 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2013). See, generally, UARG
v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248,
12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272 at 2-4.
14 42 U.S.C. §7410 (2013). The CAA also outlines the specific
steps necessary for
the EPA to take in order to designate new "pollutants for which national ambient air
quality standards" apply. 42 U.S.C. §7476(a) (2013). EPA has never classified GHGs
as a NAAQS criteria pollutant. Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684
F.3d 102, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2012). In certain states, EPA administers the CAA and creates
a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) to implement the NAAQS.

2014]A STEP BY STEP LOOK AT UARG V. EPA: A NEW LAYER OF
GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION
7
in "attainment;" (2) in "nonattainment;" or (3) "unclassifiable" with
respect to each NAAQS pollutant. 15 Depending on which designation
applies to a given area, SIPs are required to mandate that a source or
proposed source in that area follow one (or more) of the CAA's
permitting programs. 16
When sources are located in an area that is in attainment or is
unclassifiable, they must follow the CAA's Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) provisions. 17 Ever since the PSD program has
existed, "every area of the country has been designated attainment or
unclassifiable for at least one NAAQS pollutant." 18 Therefore, because
"EPA interprets the PSD provisions to apply to sources located in areas
that are designated attainment or unclassifiable for any NAAQS
pollutant, regardless of whether the source emits that specific
pollutant," all stationary sources could have to obtain a PSD permit if
they trigger the program's provisions. 19
The principal requirement of the PSD program is that a source is
required to secure a permit before it either constructs or modifies a
"major emitting facility" in "any area to which [the program] applies.
In turn, the CAA defines a "major emitting facility" as any stationary
source with the potential to emit 250 tons per year (tpy) of "any air
pollutant" (or 100 tpy for certain types of sources) 2 1 and a
,'modification" is defined as either a physical or operational change that
22
results in the facility emitting more of "any air pollutant."
42 U.S.C. §7407(d) (2013).
42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2)(C), (I).
17
42 U.S.C. §§7470 7492 (2013). Congress's goal for the PSD program was to
"protect public health and welfare from any actual or potential adverse effect which in
the Administrator's judgment may reasonably be anticipated to occur from air
pollution." 42 U.S.C. §7470(1) (Congressional declaration of purpose). See 42 U.S.C.
§7471 (2013) (requiring that SIPs for the PSD program "shall contain emission
limitations and such other measures as may be necessary... to prevent significant
deterioration of air quality in each region.").
18
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272
at 3.
19 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12
1269, 12
1272. at 3 (emphasis added).
20
42 U.S.C. §§7475(a)(1) (2013), 7479(2)(C) (2013). See UARG v. EPA, Nos.
12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272 at 3.
21
42 U.S.C. §7479(1).
22
42 U.S.C. §741 l(a)(4) (2013). The CAA does not set "by how much a physical
or operational change must increase emissions to constitute a permit-requiring
15
16
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If the source triggers the permitting requirement, it must show that
it:
will not cause, or contribute to, air pollution in excess of any (A)
maximum allowable increase or maximum allowable concentration for
any pollutant in any area to which this part applies more than one time
per year, (B) national ambient air quality standard in any air quality
control region, or (C) any other applicable emission standard or standard
of performance under [the CAA]. 3
It must also use an emissions limitation that reflects the "best
available control technology" ("BACT") for "each pollutant subject to
regulation under" the CAA.24 BACT is defined as:
an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction
of each pollutant subject to regulation" that is "achievable ... through
application of production processes and available methods, systems, and
techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or
25
innovative fuel combustion techniques.,
BACT, in turn, is established "on a case-by-case basis, taking into
account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other
26

costs.

2. Title V of the CAA

'modification."' UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269,
12 1272, Slip Op. 4 n.1.
23 42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(3).
24
42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(4). The CAA, however, does not specify the amount of
emissions of a particular "regulated pollutant" by a "major emitting facility" that would
trigger BACT for that pollutant. UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12
1268, 12 1269, 12 1272, Slip Op. at 4 n.i. By regulation, though, EPA has set
pollutant-specific numerical thresholds that represent a de minimis level, under which a
source's emissions does not trigger BACT for that pollutant. See id.; 40 C.F.R.
§§51.166(b)(2)(i), (23), (39), 0)(2) (3), 52.21(b)(2)(i), (23), (40), 0)(2) (3); see id.
(citing Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F. 2d 323, 360 361, 400, 405 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (recognizing EPA's authority to establish de minimis levels)); see id. (citing
Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U. S. 214, 231 (1992)
("[D]e minimis non curat lex . . . is part of the established background of legal
principles against which all enactments are adopted").
25 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272
at 25 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §7479(3)).
26 Id. at 25 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §7479(3)).
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Distinct from Title I's PSD permitting system, there is a permit
program found in Title V of the CAA.2 7 As a general matter, Title V
28
requires all "major sources" to have a comprehensive operating permit.
The definition of "major source" within the Title V program applies the
CAA's general definition of "major source," which states that any
stationary source with the potential to emit 100 tpy of "any air pollutant"
qualifies as a major source.29
In stark contrast with the PSD program, the Title V permitting
program does not require sources to use BACT or install any other
pollution control device for that matter. 30 Rather, its function is to
establish a single CAA document under which all of the substantive
requirements that a source must follow, such as "emissions limitations
and standards" are found.3 1
C. MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA

In 1999, a group of 19 private organizations filed a rulemaking
petition asking EPA to regulate "greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles under § 202 of the Clean Air Act. 3 2 After taking the
petition under consideration for close to four years, EPA entered an
order denying the petition in 2003. 33 In its order, EPA offered two
principal reasons for denying the petition: (1) the CAA does not
authorize EPA to promulgate GHG regulations to address global climate
change; and (2) that even if EPA had the authority to establish GHG
emission standards, it would not be prudent to do so at that time.34
In response to EPA denial, twelve states, three cities, an American
territory, and the private organizations petitioned for review of EPA's
decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

27
28
29
30

42 U.S.C. §7661 (2013) et seq. (Title V's permitting program).
42 U.S.C. §7661(a).
42 U.S.C. §§7661(2)(B), 7602(j) (2013).
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272

at 4 (stating that "[u]nlike the PSD program, Title V generally does not impose any
substantive pollution-control requirements.").
31
42 U.S.C. §7661c(a) (c). Title V permits also include associated inspection,
monitoring, and reporting requirements. Id.
32
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510 (2007); 42 U.S.C. §7521 (2013).
33 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 510 (citing 68 Fed.Reg. 52922 at 52925 52929,
52929 52931).
34
See id. at 510 (citing 52925 52929 and 52929 52931).
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Circuit.3 5 A divided panel of the court agreed with the EPA's decision
to not regulate GHGs, and held that in the context of scientific and
policy considerations, the "EPA administrator properly exercised his
discretion in denying the petition for rulemaking. 3 6 The petitioners
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.37
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court, in Massachusetts v. EPA,
reversed the D.C. Circuit Court and held that GHGs were "air
pollutants" within the meaning of the CAA. 38 The Court had little
trouble in concluding that GHGs fit within CAA's "sweeping
definition" of "air pollutant," which included "any air pollution agent or
combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical ...
substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the
ambient air ... ,"9 It therefore rejected EPA's argument that the CAA
had not authorized it to regulate GHGs to address climate change.4 °
Next, the Court rejected EPA's argument that, even if EPA had the
statutory authority, it would be "unwise" to regulate GHGs at this time,
calling EPA's explanation "divorced from the statutory text.' 41 But
because EPA had not offered a "reasoned explanation for its refusal to
decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change"
that was grounded in the CAA, the Court remanded the issue to EPA to
42
give such an explanation.
II.

THE REGULATION OF

GHGs

A. GHG RULEMAKINGS BY EPA IN

AFTER MASSACHUSETTS

RESPONSE TO MASSACHUSETTS V.

EPA
Following the Supreme Court's conclusion in Massachusetts v.
EPA that GHGs "unambiguous[Ily]" qualify as "air pollutants" that can
be regulated under the Act, EPA promulgated a "cascading series of

Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
See id. at 58.
37 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510 (2007).
38
Id., at 532.
39
Id., at 528-529 (citing 42 U.S.C. §7602(g)).
40
Id., at 528-529.
41
Id., at 532.
42
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 506 (2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
7521(a)(1) (2013)).
35
36
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greenhouse gas-related rules and regulations. 43 Consistent with the
Court's direction that "EPA can avoid taking further action only if it
determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or
if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not
exercise its discretion to determine whether they do," EPA engaged in
an extensive notice and comment proceeding on this issue.4 4 More
specifically, EPA sought to assess "whether sufficient information exists
to make an endangerment finding" for GHGs.45
After studying this issue for several years, EPA issued its
"Endangerment Finding" that determined that GHGs "may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare., 46 In defining the
universe of GHGs to be regulated, the Endangerment Finding
established a single "air pollutant" as an "aggregate group of six longlived and directly-emitted greenhouse gases" that are "well mixed"
' 47
together in the atmosphere and cause global climate change. ,
Specifically, it listed "carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride., 48 By
calculating the impact of these particular GHGs on a "carbon dioxide
equivalent basis," (CO 2e) EPA concluded that emissions of these six
well-mixed gases from motor-vehicles "contribute to the total
greenhouse gas air pollution, and thus to the climate change problem,

43

Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 115 (D.C.

Cir. 2012) (citing Massachusettsv. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 529 (2007)).
44

Massachusetts, at 533. See, e.g. Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions under

the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008) ("This advance notice of
proposed rulemaking (ANPR) presents information relevant to, and solicits public
comment on, how to respond to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Massachusettsv.
EPA."), Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findingsfor Greenhouse
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (April 24, 2009)

("Today the Administrator is proposing to find that greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
endanger the public health and welfare of current and future generations.").
45 Massachusetts, at 534.
46

Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findingsfor Greenhouse Gases Under

Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act ("Endangerment Finding"), 74 Fed. Reg. 66,536-37

(Dec. 15, 2009). See 42 U.S.C. §7521(a)(1).
47

Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findingsfor Greenhouse Gases Under

Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act ("Endangerment Finding"), 74 Fed. Reg. at 536-37.

See Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 114 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
48

Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findingsfor Greenhouse Gases Under

Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act ("Endangerment Finding"), 74 Fed. Reg. at 536-37.
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to endanger public health and

Based on this finding, which was grounded in statutory authority
found in the motor-vehicle provisions of the CAA, EPA was then
required to promulgate regulations establishing GHG emission standards
for cars and light trucks. 50 But before promulgating these standards
(which would subsequently appear in a separate rule known as the
"Tailpipe Rule"), EPA announced its "final decision" regarding the
impact that the establishment of motor-vehicle greenhouse-gas standards
would have on the stationary source permitting programs found in Title
I (i.e., the PSD program) and Title V. 51 This became known as the
52
"Triggering Rule."
During the development of the Endangerment Finding, EPA had
expressed its "longstanding interpretation" that a Tailpipe Rule would
automatically trigger regulation of all stationary sources with the
potential to emit GHGs in excess of certain statutory thresholds. 53
49 Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc., 684 F.3d at 114-115. Endangerment
and Cause or Contribute Findingsfor Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the
Clean Air Act ("Endangerment Finding"), 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,499. Carbon Dioxide
equivalent (CO 2 e) is based on the gases' "warming effect relative to carbon dioxide ...
over a specified timeframe." See Endangermentand Cause or Contribute Findingsfor
Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act ("Endangerment
Finding"), 74 Fed. Reg. at 536,519. See also Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc.
v. EPA, 684 F.3d at 114 ("Using the carbon dioxide equivalent equation, for example, a
mixture of X amount of nitrous oxide and Y amount of sulfur hexafluoride is expressed
as Z amount of CO 2e").
50 Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113 (D.C.
Cir. 2012). Under 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), EPA is required to set motor-vehicle
emission standards for "any air pollutant ...
which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare." Therefore, EPA had a "statutory obligation" to
regulate harmful greenhouse gases, once EPA had made its finding. 42 U.S.C. §
7521(a)(1); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007).
51 See 42 U.S.C. §7470 (2013) et seq. (Title I's Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) program); 42 U.S.C. §7661 (2013) et seq. (Title V's permitting
program).
52 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272
at 6 (stating "hereinafter Triggering Rule").
53 Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d at 115. See id.
("EPA has long interpreted the phrase "any air pollutant" in both these provisions to
mean any air pollutant that is regulated under the CAA. See Requirements for
Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and
Promulgation of Implementation Plans ("1980 Implementation Plan Requirements"), 45
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These thresholds (as set forth, supra.) were 100 tpy under Title V and
either 100 or 250 tpy under the PSD program depending on the type of
54
source.
The staggering implication of its interpretation was not lost on
EPA: it recognized that GHG emissions are generally "orders of
magnitude greater" than the emissions of conventional pollutants
regulated under those programs. 55 As a consequence, EPA recognized
that countless "smaller industrial sources," "large office and residential
buildings, hotels, large retail establishments, and similar facilities"
would now be subject to both PSD and Title V permitting. 56 This would
have both "a profound effect on virtually every sector of the economy
and touch every household in the land," as well as represent an
"unprecedented expansion of EPA authority., 57
Nonetheless, EPA's final decision was that, as predicted, a Tailpipe
Rule would in fact trigger stationary-source permitting requirements. 58
With respect to timing, EPA determined that as soon as the Tailpipe
Rule became effective, stationary sources would then potentially be
subject to the PSD program and Title V based on their GHG
emissions. 59 And shortly thereafter, EPA released the Tailpipe Rule,
establishing emission standards for carbon dioxide for cars and trucks
built for Model Years 2012 through 2016.60 EPA made these standards
effective as of January 2, 2011, but recognizing the consequence of
making these standards effective, EPA issued another rule. 61

Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,711 (Aug. 7, 1980) (PSD program); Prevention of Significant
Deteriorationand Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule ("Tailoring Rule"), 75 Fed.
Reg. 31,514, 31,553 54 (June 3, 2010) (discussing history of Title V regulation and
applicability)). See also 73 Fed. Reg. 44420, 44498, 44511 (2008).
54
42 U.S.C. §7479(1) (2013) (PSD Program); 42 U.S.C. §§7661(2)(B), 7602(j)
(2013) (Title V program). See UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12
1268, 12 1269, 12 1272 at 5.
55
See UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272 at 5 (quoting 73 Fed. Reg. 44430, 44498 44499).
56
Id.
57
See Id. at 5 (quoting 73 Fed. Reg. 44355).
58
See Id.. at 6 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 17004 (2010)).
59

Id.

Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,329-30 (May 7, 2010); see
Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
61
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010).
60
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In its "Tailoring Rule," EPA sought to tailor the PSD and Title V
programs in order to "reliev[e] overwhelming permitting burdens that
would, in the absence of this rule, fall on permitting authorities and
sources." 62 Under this "phase-in approach," EPA stated that it would
gradually increase the number of sources subject to PSD and Title V
63
over time by altering the threshold levels.
Under Step 1, which spanned from January 2 through June 30,
2011, sources that already were subject to PSD and Title V because of
their emission of conventional pollutants (so-called "anyway sources")
would have to follow the PSD program's BACT requirement for GHGs
if they emitted 75,000 tpy or more CO2e.64 No source, however, would
"become newly subject to the PSD program or Title V solely on the
basis of its greenhouse-gas emissions" during this period. 65 During Step
2, which lasted from July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2012, "non-anyway
sources" (i.e., sources that were not already subject to the PSD program)
that had the potential to emit at least 100,000 tpy per year CO 2e of
GHGs would now fall within the PSD and Title V permitting
requirements. 66 Likewise, a source that undertook a "modification" that
would increase its GHG emissions by at least 75,000 tpy CO 2e would
also be subject to the program.6 7
For Step 3, which began on July 1, 2013, EPA indicated that it
would not commit to whether it would alter the thresholds moving
forward or make other adjustments such as exempting certain sources
from the programs. 68 For additional steps beyond Step 3, EPA pledged

62

Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113 (D.C.

Cir. 2012) (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 31,516 (2010)).
63 See UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272 at 7 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (2010)).
64 Seeld. at 7 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (2010)).
65 See Id. 7-8 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (2010)).
See Id. at 8 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 31,523-24 (2010)). Steps 1 and 2 were
codified at 40 C.F.R. §§51.166(b)(48) and 52.21(b)(49) for PSD and at §§70.2 and 71.2
for Title V. See Tailoring Rule 31,606 31,608.
67 See UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269,
12
66

1272 at 8 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 31,523-24 (2010)). Steps 1 and 2 were codified at 40
C.F.R. §§51.166(b)(48) and 52.21(b)(49) for PSD and at §§70.2 and 71.2 for Title V.
See Tailoring Rule 31,606 31,608.
68 See id. at 8 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 31,524 (2010)).
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to engage in a rulemaking by April 30, 2016, to decide on how to handle
69
smaller sources.
THE US. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D. C. CIRCUIT CASE OF

B.

COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION V.

EPA

Unsurprisingly, the Endangerment Finding, as well as the Tailpipe,
Triggering and Tailoring Rules were quickly challenged in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Coalition for Responsible
Regulation v. EPA. 70 The panel of the D.C. Circuit consolidated the
petitions for review for the four final agency actions by EPA.7 1
In a per curiam decision, the panel held that both the Endangerment
Finding and Tailpipe Rule were neither arbitrary nor capricious. 72 With
respect to stationary sources, it found that EPA's interpretation that it
must regulate GHGs from stationary sources was compelled by the
statute and therefore dismissed the various petitioners' challenges on
this issue. 73 The panel also determined that it was "crystal clear that
PSD pemittees must install BACT for greenhouse gases., 74 With
respect to the permitting requirements under Title V, it held that the
petitioners had "forfeited any challenges to EPA's greenhouse gasinclusive interpretation of Title V.",75 Finally, the panel further found
that none of the petitioners had standing to challenge the Timing and
Tailoring Rule and therefore dismissed the petitions on this issue for a

69

See id. at 8 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 31,525 (2010)). EPA codified its commitments
with respect to Step 3 and beyond at §§52.22, 70.12, and 71.13. See Tailoring Rule
31606 31608. In 2012, EPA issued its final Step 3 rule, in which it decided not to
lower the thresholds it had established at Step 2 until at least 2016. 77 Fed. Reg. 41,051
(2012).
70

Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 116 (D.C.

Cir. 2012).
71

Id.

at 116.

72

Id. at 116. These challenges were made under 42 U. S. C. §7607(b) (2013),
which directs a court to "reverse the Administrator's action in rulemaking if it is
'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law."' Med. Waste Inst. & Energy Recovery Council v. EPA, 645 F.3d 420, 424 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A)).
73

Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 116 (D.C.

Cir. 2012).
74
75

Id. at 137.
Id. at 136.
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lack of jurisdiction under Article 111.76 The D.C. Circuit denied
rehearing en banc, with Judge Brown and Judge Kavanaugh separately
77
dissenting.
III.

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION

In response to the per curiam decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit, various parties petitioned for writs of certiorari
objecting to numerous facets of the Endangerment Finding, as well as
the related GHG rules. 78 Following the October 15, 2013 conference,
the U.S. Supreme Court granted six petitions for a writ of certiorari and
set forth the question presented as "whether the EPA permissibly
determined that its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles triggered permitting requirements under the Clean Air
Act for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases. 7 9
On June 23, 2014, a divided Court affirmed in part and reversed in
part the judgment of the D.C. Circuit. Justice Scalia wrote the majority
opinion, with Justice Breyer and Alito, each writing separate opinions,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. 80 Justice Breyer's opinion was
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. 81 Justice Alito's
82
opinion was joined by Justice Thomas.
A.

THE MAJORITY OPINION BY JUSTICE SCALIA

Justice Scalia writing for 4 Justices (Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito) introduced the case as involving
"two distinct challenges to EPA's stance on greenhouse-gas permitting

Id. at 146.
Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 2012 WL 6621785 (decision
on rehearing en bane).
76

77
78

Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 114 (D.C.

Cir. 2012).
79
Supreme Court, Order List: 571 U.S. 3 (Oct. 15, 2013), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/101513zor 4g25.pdf
[[hereinafter
Order List] (granting certiorari to Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, Am. Chemistry
Council v. EPA, Energy-Intensive Mfrs. Working Group on Greenhouse Gas
Regulation v. EPA, Se. Legal Found. v. EPA, Texas v. EPA, and Chamber of
Commerce v. EPA, and consolidating the cases).
80
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272
at 9.
81 Id. Opinion of Breyer, J. at 2.
82 Id. Opinion of Alito, J. at
2.
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for stationary sources. 8 3 He stated that the Court must first "decide
whether EPA permissibly determined that a source may be subject to the
PSD and Title V permitting requirements on the sole basis of the
source's potential to emit greenhouse gases. 84
His analysis of this
question encompassed three distinct inquiries: (1) whether EPA's view
was compelled by the statute (Part II-A-1); (2) whether EPA's view
(although not compelled) was a reasonable construction of the CAA
(Part II-A-2); and (3) whether EPA's promulgation of the Tailoring Rule
cured the unreasonable results that logically followed from EPA's
85
interpretation (Part II-A-3).
The second question for the Court, in his view, was to determine
whether EPA "permissibly determined that a source already subject to
the PSD program because of its emission of conventional pollutants (an
"anyway source") may be required to limit its greenhouse-gas emissions
by employing the "best available control technology" for greenhouse
gases. 8 6 This discussion was found in Part II-B-1 and Part II-B-2.87
Justice Scalia also set forth that the Court would follow the
standard of review established by Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.88 under which an agency is entitled to
89
resolve statutory ambiguities found with a statute it administers.
Accordingly, he would assess whether EPA's interpretation was
reasonable and had "stayed within the bounds of its statutory
90
authority."
83

Id. at 9.

84

UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12

1272, at 9 (emphasis added).
85

Id. at 9-10.

Id. at 9 (emphasis added). Justice Scalia pointed out how the EPA, through the
Solicitor General of the United States, "evidently regards the second [issue] as more
important" because these so-called "anyway sources" comprise of approximately 83%
of U.S. stationary-source greenhouse-gas emissions, as contrasted to 3% for the sources
captured under the first issue (that EPA sought to regulate at Steps 2 and 3 of the
Tailoring Rule). Id. at 9-10 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 52).
86

87

Id. at 9-10.

Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S.
837, 842 843 (1984).
89
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272
88

at 10.
90

UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12

1272, at 10 (citing Arlington v. FCC, 569 U. S.
(emphasis deleted)).

,

(2013) (slip op., at 5)

18

EARTH JURISPRUDENCEAND
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

1. Whether EPA permissibly determined that a source may be
subject to the PSD and Title V permitting requirements on
the sole basis of the source'spotential to emit GHGs ("nonanyway sources')
In Part II-A, authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito, the Court analyzed
whether EPA was correct that a source triggers the permitting
requirements of both the PSD and Title V programs based exclusively
on its potential to emit GHGs above the thresholds. 9 1 EPA argued that
its interpretation on this issue followed unambiguously from the CAA,
but that even if it was not compelled, it represented a reasonable
construction of the CAA
especially given its promulgation of the
Tailoring Rule to mitigate any absurd results.92
The 5-4 majority, however, rejected EPA's view and held that the
"statute compelled EPA's greenhouse-gas-inclusive interpretation with
respect to neither the PSD program nor Title V.",93 It then similarly
rejected EPA's attempt to enforce this interpretation as part of its
discretionary ability to construe ambiguous terms in the CAA and
relatedly found that EPA's attempt to tailor the CAA as to these sources
was impermissible.94
a. Whether EPA's view that sources were required to obtain
PSD and Title V permits based solely on their potential
GHG emissions was compelled by the statute

91

Id. at 10. 42 U.S.C. §7470 (2013) et seq. (Title I's Prevention of Significant

Deterioration (PSD) program); 42 U.S.C. §7661 (2013) et seq. (Title V's permitting
program). Justice Scalia called these "non-anyway sources", contrasting them from
"anyway sources" which are sources are already regulated under PSD and Title V for
other pollutants.
92
Id. at 10. The D.C. Circuit concurred with EPA's construction of the statute,
holding that the statute "compelled" this interpretation. Coalition for Responsible
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
93 Id. at 10. In ruling on this issue, the Court also rejected the D.C. Circuit's
holding that the petitioners' arguments on this issue had only applied with respect to the
PSD program and that petitioners had therefore "forfeited any challenges to EPA's
greenhouse gas-inclusive interpretation of Title V." See id. at 10 n.4 (citing Coalition
for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
94 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, at 10-24.
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In Part II-A-1, the Court addressed whether EPA was correct when
it had determined that the CAA compelled EPA to require sources to
obtain PSD and Title V permits based solely on potential GHG
emissions that exceeded the statutory thresholds. 95 In analyzing this
issue, the Court first examined the definition of "air pollutant" applied
by the lower court when it determined that EPA's interpretation was
correct.9 6
The Court concluded that the D.C. Circuit had erred by applying a
"flawed syllogism" when it had analyzed the phrase "air pollutant" as
that term is used within various provisions of the Clean Air Act.9 7 The
panel had reasoned that because the act-wide definition of "air
pollutant" included GHGs (as confirmed by the Court in Massachusetts)
and that because the PSD and Title V provisions make major sources of
"air pollutants" subject to those provisions, then major emitters of
GHGs therefore needed PSD and Title V permits. 98 But such a
conclusion, the Court held, presupposed that the definition of "air
pollutant" meant the same thing under the "general, Act-wide
definition" as it did under the "permitting requiring provisions." 99 The
Court found this proposition "obviously untenable."100
The Court acknowledged that in Massachusetts it had previously
defined "air pollutant" to include "greenhouse gases because it is allencompassing; it 'embraces all airborne compounds of whatever
stripe."' 10 1 However, it declined to extend its interpretation of "air
pollutant" to instances where the term is used in "operative provisions"
of the CAA where EPA had "routinely given it a narrower, contextappropriate meaning. ,~102

95
96

Id. atll.
Id. atl.

Id. atll.
Id. at 11.
99 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268,
12 1269, 12
1272, at 11. The Court called the Act-wide definition "the major premise" and the
permitting-requiring provisions "the minor premise." Id. at 11.
1oo Id. at 11.
1o
Id. at 11 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 529 (2007)).
102
Id. at 11 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 529 (2007)). The Court
97

98

noted that the CAA defines an air pollutant is "any air pollution agent or combination of
such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, [or] radioactive ... substance
or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air." Id. (citing 42
U.S.C. §7602(g)).
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Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, pointed out that EPA since
1978 had interpreted the phrase "any air pollutant" in the PSD triggering
provision to only apply to regulated air pollutants, which naturally was
"a class much narrower" than the sweeping construction set forth in
Massachusetts.10 3 EPA, he noted, had construed the Title V triggering
provision similarly since 1993.104 In light of EPA's long-standing
"reasonable, context-appropriate meanings," Justice Scalia criticized
EPA for not devising a similarly context-based interpretation with
respect to GHGs in the PSD and Title V contexts. 105
He then went on to list several other examples where EPA deviated
from applying an all-encompassing definition when there had appeared
a "generic references to air pollutants" in the CAA. 10 6 These included
references from the New Source Performance standards (NSPS)
provisions, 10 7 the Non-Attainment New Source Review provisions,108 an
enhanced monitoring provision, 10 9
and a visibility protection
103

Id. at 11 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 26403, codified, as amended, 40 C.F.R.

§52.21(b)(l) (2), (50)).
1C4 Id. at 12 (citing Memorandum from Lydia N. Wegman, Deputy Director,
Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, to Air Division Director, Regions I X,
pp. 4 5 (Apr. 26, 1993)). See also, Tailoring Rule 31607 31608 (amending 40 C.F.R.
§§70.2, 71.2).
105 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269,
12
1272, at 12. Although it criticized EPA that "it is plain as day that the Act does not
envision an elaborate, burdensome permitting process for major emitters of steam,
oxygen, or other harmless airborne substances" it does seem to sidestep that these
admittedly "harmless" substances are different than GHGs.
106 Id. at 12-13.
107 Id. at 12. A NSPS applies if an existing source undergoes
a physical or
operational change that increases its emission of "any air pollutant." Id. 42 U.S.C
§7411(a)(2) (2013), (4), (b)(1)(B). When determining whether there has been an
increase of "any air pollutant," EPA only looks to pollutants to which EPA has already
promulgated new source performance standards. Id.; 36 Fed. Reg. 24877 (1971),
codified, as amended, 40 C.F.R. §60.2; 40 Fed. Reg. 58419 (1975), codified, as
amended, 40 C.F.R. §60.14(a).
108 Id. at 12-13.
Under the non-attainment NSR provisions, sources with the
potential to emit 100 tons per year of "any air pollutant" within a nonattainment area
need a construction and operation permit. Id. 42 U.S.C. §7502(c)(5) (2013), 7602(j)
(2013). EPA interprets this requirement as to only apply to pollutants for which the
area is designated as being in nonattainment. Id.; 45 Fed. Reg. 52745 (1980),
promulgating 40 C.F.R. §51.18()(2), as amended, §51.165(a)(2).
109 Id. at 13. The CAA requires EPA to mandate "enhanced monitoring
and
submission of compliance certifications" for sources with the potential to emit 100 tons
per year of "any air pollutant," which EPA interprets to be limited to regulated
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provision.11 ° These examples, he asserted, demonstrated how EPA had
previously limited the definition of "any air pollutant."11' 1
He was also clear that the Court's Massachusetts decision did not
alter these narrower, longstanding interpretations of "any air
pollutant."'1 12
Rather, he characterized the Court's holding in
Massachusetts as having provided "a description of the universe of
substances EPA may consider regulating under the Act's operative
provisions."'1 13 In other words, the "capacious" interpretation of "air
pollutant" was "not a command to regulate" all such pollutants under the
CAA. 114
EPA retained authority to decline to regulate certain air
pollutants in circumstances where to do so would be at odds with the
structure of the CAA. 115
Justice Scalia then explained why this shifting meaning of "air
pollutant" within the CAA was justified as a matter of statutory
construction.1 16 He first characterized Congress's use of the term "air
pollutant" as "not conducive to clarity" and then dismissed the CAA as
not a being a masterpiece of legislative drafting. 117 Then, to counter the
canon of construction "that identical words used in different parts of the
'
same act are intended to have the same meaning,"118
he turned to
another "canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must
be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall

pollutants. Id. (citing §7414(a)(3), 7602(j) and 62 Fed. Reg. 54941 (1997), codified at
40 C.F.R. §§64.1, 64.2).
11o
Id. at 13. Under the CAA, some sources of air pollutants that interfere with
visibility must retrofit their facilities if they have the potential to emit 250 tons per year
of "any pollutant," which EPA interprets to be limited to visibility-impairing air
pollutants. Id. (citing §7491(b)(2)(A), (g)(7) and 70 Fed. Reg. 39160 (2005), codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. Y, §II.A.3).
fi
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, at 13.
112 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, at 13.
113 Id. at 14.
14
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272
at 14 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 49, 528, 532 (2007).
15
Id. at 14.
116 Id. at 15.
117

Id.

18

Id. (quoting Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U. S. 561, 574

(2007)).
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statutory scheme."'1 19 Therefore, even a statutory term defined by statute
"may take on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory
objects calling for different implementation strategies., 120 Based on this
"fundamental" canon, he asserted, the presumption of consistent usage
of the term "air pollutant" in the CAA "readily yields" to context in this
case. 121
In his majority opinion, however, he was careful to limit the reach
of its analysis and holding on this issue. 122 He made clear that it was not
passing "on the validity of all the limiting constructions EPA has given
the term 'air pollutant' throughout the Act., 123 Rather, he was simply
rejecting EPA's position that the same expansive definition of "air
pollutant" found by the Court in Massachusetts did not bind EPA's
hands when it interpreted the PSD and Title V permitting requirements,
especially in the face of incompatibility of regulating GHGs in those
programs. 124
Justice Scalia, on behalf of the Court on this issue, concluded by
noting that there was "no insuperable textual barrier" for EPA to limit its
interpretation of "any air pollutant" in the triggering provisions of PSD
and Title V to only those pollutants that can be "sensibly" regulated by
those programs. 125 Likewise, it was entirely consistent with the CAA
(and the Court's decision in Massachusetts) for EPA "to exclude those
atypical pollutants that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in such vast
quantities that their inclusion would radically transform those programs
and render them unworkable as written." 126 For all these reasons, the
119

(2000)).
120

Id. (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 133
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12

1272, at 13 (quoting Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U. S. 561, 574
(2007)).
121
Id. at 15 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120,
133 (2000)).
122
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272
at 15.
123
124
125
126

Id.
Id.
Id.
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12

1272, at 15-16. The Court declined to determine whether any of the proffered
interpretations (that limited the reach of the PSD triggers) were reasonable. For
example, the Court noted that Judge Kavanaugh has asserted below that it would be
reasonable for EPA to construe "any air pollutant" in the PSD context to encompass
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Court rejected EPA's argument that the plain language of the CAA
compelled EPA to find that sources
of GHG emissions were subject to
127
the PSD and Title V provisions.
b. Whether EPA's interpretation that excessive GHGs
emissions triggered PSD and Title V was a reasonable
interpretation of the CAA
Although EPA had argued that its interpretation that GHGs
regulation had been triggered under the PSD and Title V was mandated
by the plain language of the CAA, it also maintained that, even if not
128
compelled, it was nonetheless a permissible construction of the Act.
In Part II-A-2, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, addressed this alternate argument
129
and concluded that EPA's interpretation was not reasonable.
Although the majority recognized that Chevron provided a
deferential framework that allowed EPA to "operate 'within the bounds
of reasonable interpretation,"' it rejected EPA's view.13 ° The Court
reasoned that the proper statutory interpretation of an ambiguous term
must look to "the specific context in which ...language is used" as well
as "the broader context of the statute as a whole., 131 Thus, a seemingly
ambiguous statutory provision "is often clarified by the remainder of the
statutory scheme" especially in circumstances where only one

only the six NAAQS pollutants. Id. at 16 (citing Coalition for Responsible Regulation,
Inc. v. EPA, No. 09 1322 etc. (CADC, Dec. 20, 2012), App. 171 180, 2012 WL
6621785, *15 *18 (opinion dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane)). Other
petitioners set forth a more nuanced argument that because "permitting is required only
for major emitting facilities "in any area to which [the PSD program] applies," 42
U.S.C. §7475(a) (2013), the relevant pollutants are only those NAAQS pollutants for
which the area in question is designated attainment or unclassifiable." Id. And still
others offered an even more limited interpretation; namely, that "any air pollutant" in
the PSD provision should be cabined to air pollutants that had localized effects on air
quality. Id.
127
Id. at 16.
128
Id. See Tailoring Rule 31517.
129
Id.
130
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, at 16 (citing Arlington, 569 U. S., at 1868 (slip op., at 5)). Chevron U. S. A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.467 U. S.837, 842 843 (1984).
131
Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997)).
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construction results in "a substantive effect that is compatible with the
' 13 2
rest of the law."
The Court then highlighted that EPA had "repeatedly
acknowledged that applying the PSD and Title V permitting
requirements to greenhouse gases would be inconsistent with in fact,
would overthrow the Act's structure and design., 133 For example,
EPA had conceded that applications for PSD permit would balloon from
approximately 800 to about 82,000 each year. 134 Similarly, the
administrative costs of the PSD program would skyrocket from $12
million to over $1.5 billion. 135 And even more troublesome would be
the "decade-long delays" that could result which would cause
"construction projects to grind to a halt nationwide., 136
With respect to the Title V program, the Court called the
consequences "equally bleak" if sources were required to secure permits
based on the potential GHG emissions. 137 Permits would be required for
over 6 million sources (up from about 15,000 sources) and
administrative costs would rise from $62 million to $21 billion
annually. 138 And even more dramatically, "the newly covered sources
139
would [collectively] face permitting costs of $147 billion.,
Beyond these practical consequences, the Court further explained
that the inclusion of the smaller sources would contravene congressional
intent: a result EPA had conceded during its rulemaking for the
Tailoring Rule. 140 For instance, the majority quoted EPA's admission
that inclusion of GHGs as a regulated pollutant under PSD and Title
Id. at 16-17 (quoting United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988)). See id. ("an agency interpretation that is
"inconsisten[t] with the design and structure of the statute as a whole," does not merit
deference" quoting University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,570 U.S.
133
, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2529, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013), (slip op., at 13)).
Id. at 17.
134 Id. (citing Tailoring Rule 31557).
135
Id.
136 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
132

1272, at 17.
137 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, at 17.
138 Id. (citing Tailoring Rule at 31562 31563).
139 Id.

Id. at 17 (quoting EPA's Tailoring Rule (at 31533) that "the great majority of
additional sources brought into the PSD and title V programs would be small sources
that Congress did not expect would need to undergo permitting.").
140
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programs would result in a 1,000-fold increase in the statutory
permitting thresholds and would therefore
"so severely undermine what
' 14 1
Congress sought to accomplish."
Next, the Court explained that the PSD and Title V programs were
aimed towards "a relative handful of large sources capable of
shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens. 142 To mandate
that smaller sources must secure permits for their GHG emissions alone
would therefore conflict with Congress's regulatory design. 143 To
support its view, the Court cited to provisions within the PSD provisions
144
that levy "numerous and costly requirements" on covered sources.
For example, application materials for a PSD permit include detailed
analyses of potential pollution-related effects, demonstrations that
potential emissions will not contribute to applicable pollution standards,
as well as identifying (and subsequently installing) the "best available
control technology" for every regulated pollutant emitted. 145
Likewise, the Court pointed out that the CAA imposes a significant
workload on the permitting authority, which is usually a state agency in
states that have federally delegated programs. 146 The reviewing agency
is required to grant or deny a permit within a year and must convene a
public hearing on the source's request for a permit.147 Thus, the Court
parroted EPA's own words that the PSD's "complicated, resourceintensive, time-consuming, and sometimes contentious process"
highlighted why Congress must have contemplated the program
applying to "hundreds of larger sources,' not 'tens of thousands of
148
smaller sources.,
Although the Court conceded that Title V did not contain parallel
substantive mandates, it did note that the procedural requirements were
substantial. 149 Among other requirements, sources subject to Title V
must apply for a permit within a year of becoming subject to the
Id. (quoting Tailoring Rule at 31554).
Id.
143
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, at 17 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 156).
141
142

144

Id. at 18.

145

Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(3), (4), (6), (e)).
Id. at 18-19.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(2), (c)).
Id. (quoting 74 Fed. Reg. 55304, 55321 55322).
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12

146
147
148
149

1272, at 17.
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program and include a "compliance plan" outlining how it will meet its
obligations under the CAA, along with an on-going annual certification,
as well as agreeing to "inspection, entry, monitoring ... and reporting
requirements. ' 150 The Court finished its analysis of Title V by repeating
EPA's own view that Title V is "finely crafted for thousands," not
millions, of sources. 151
Justice Scalia concluded the five Justice Majority decision on this
issue by relying on an additional reason why EPA's interpretation was
unreasonable. 152 He also found that inclusion of GHGs within the PSD
and Title V triggers "would bring about an enormous and transformative
expansion in EPA's regulatory authority without clear congressional
authorization." 153
And especially when an agency's new-found
interpretation impacts "a significant portion of the American economy,
he warned that the Court must be skeptical in the absence of clear
154
direction by Congress.
Here, he held, EPA's interpretation that required permits for
millions of small sources fell "comfortably" within the type of
interpretations that the Court could not condone in the name of agency
discretion.155 The Court was even more convinced of its decision given
150

UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12

1272, at 17 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§7661b(b) (c) (2013), 7661c(a) (c)). The Court also
outlined the significant procedural burdens on the permitting authorities, such as the
requirement of (1) holding a public hearing (§7661a(b)(6)); (2) forwarding the
application and any proposed permit to EPA and adjoining States (§7661d(a)); (3)
responding in writing to their comments (§7661d(b)(1)). Slip Op. at 19. See also
§§7661a(b)(7), 7661b(c) (if permitting authority does not issue or deny the permit
within 18 months, any interested party can sue to compel a decision "without additional
delay") and §7661d(b)(2) (3) (interested party can petition EPA to block permit and
EPA must grant or deny such a petition within 60 days, and that decision is subject to
judicial review).
151
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272 at 19. (quoting Tailoring Rule at 31563).
153

Id.
Id.

154

Id. (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 159).

152

See also MCI

Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218,
231 (1994); Industrial Union Dept., AFL CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.
S. 607, 645 646 (1980) (plurality opinion).
155
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, at 19-20. The Court declined to take on the EPA's argument that if EPA were to
change its long-held interpretation of "potential to emit" then the number of sources
that would trigger the permitting provisions would drastically minimized. Id. at 20 n.7.
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EPA's admission that a contrary conclusion would transform the CAA
into a statute that EPA itself had admitted would be "unrecognizable to
156
the Congress that designed" it.
c. Whether EPA's could make its interpretation reasonable
by adjusting the levels at which a source would trigger
the PSD and Title V permitting requirements
In the final section of the Court's Opinion, Part II-A-3, Justice
Scalia, again writing for the Court, assessed whether EPA could "cure"
its unreasonable interpretation of the CAA by "tailoring" the PSD and
Title V requirements. 157 As set forth in more detail supra, EPA's
Tailoring rule established a 100,000 tpy CO 2e trigger for GHGs,
essentially overriding the statutory 100 or 250 tpy trigger that applies to
all other regulated pollutants. 158 The Court concluded that EPA could
not rewrite the statutory thresholds in an effort to "validate" its
159
interpretation of the triggering provisions to include GHGs.
The Court's view on this issue was straightforward:
An agency has no power to "tailor" legislation to bureaucratic
policy goals by rewriting unambiguous statutory terms. Agencies
exercise discretion only in the interstices created by statutory silence or

The Court suggested that, even if such an interpretation were to be proffered, it was
questionable whether "eliminate the unreasonableness of EPA's interpretation."
Likewise, it expressed doubt that "streamlining" the permitting process (such as issuing
"general" or "electronic" permit) would cure the "fundamental problem of EPA's
claiming regulatory authority over millions of small entities that it acknowledges the
Act does not seek to regulate." Id. (at 20 n.7.)
156
Id. at 20 (quoting Tailoring Rule at 31555). The Court also declined to shed
light as to whether a similar result would follow if EPA were to re-define to exclude
carbon dioxide from its "aggregate pollutant" definition. Id. at 20 n.7. This, according
to EPA would make the inclusion of GHGs compatible with the PSD program and Title
V. Id. (20 n.7).
157
Id. The Court noted that the D.C. Court had held that petitioners lacked Article
III standing to challenge the Tailoring Rule because that the rule did not harm
petitioners because it, in fact, had "relaxed" the statutory requirements. Id. at 21. But
because EPA relied on the Rule in order to make its interpretation reasonable, the Court
analyzed the validity of the Rule. Id.. at 21.
158
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, at 21.
159
Id.
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ambiguity; they must always "give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. 160
In this case, the "precise numerical thresholds" found in the PSD
and Title V could not be clearer and thus the Court found that EPA's
attempt to substitute its own numbers was "well beyond the bounds of
161
its statutory authority.
The Court noted that EPA had not asserted that the revised
thresholds in the Tailoring Rule were merely an expression that EPA
would not enforce against smaller sources. 162 Rather, the Court
recognized that EPA needed to alter the statutory limits to protect
smaller sources from citizen suits, whereby sources could be enjoined
from constructing, modifying or operating, as well as face civil penalties
of up to $37,500 per day of violation. 163 Especially given that EPA had
recently confirmed citizens had "independent enforcement authority"
that could not be negated by EPA's (or a State's) decision not to enforce
the provisions of the CAA, the Tailoring Rule became an essential
164
element to make EPA's interpretation reasonable.
165
Next, the Court found irrelevant the case of Morton v. Ruiz,
which EPA had argued supported the Tailoring Rule. 166 In Ruiz, the
Id. at 21. (quoting National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,
551 U. S. 644, 665 (2007) (quoting Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843)).
161 Id. at 20 (quoting Arlington, 569 U. S., at
(slip op., at 5) (internal
quotations deleted)).
162 Id. at 21-22.
163 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
160

1272, at. 22 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§7413(b), 7604(a), (f)(4); 40 C.F.R. §19.4).
164
Id. at 22(citing 78 Fed. Reg. 12477, 12486 12487 (2013)). See id. at 22 ("The
Solicitor General is therefore quite right to acknowledge that the availability of citizen
suits made it necessary for EPA, in seeking to mitigate the unreasonableness of its
greenhouse-gas-inclusive interpretation, to go beyond merely exercising its
enforcement discretion" (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 87 88)).
165 Id. at 22.
166
Id. (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 71, 80 81). The Court summarized the Ruiz, as
follows: "Congress had appropriated funds for the Bureau of Indian Affairs to spend on
providing assistance to "Indians throughout the United States" and had not "impose[d]
any geographical limitation on the availability of general assistance benefits." Id. at 22
(quoting Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199, 206 207, and n. 7 (1974)). It held that "the Bureau could
not deny benefits to off-reservation Indians because it had not published its eligibility
criteria" and "stated in dictum that the Bureau could, if it followed proper
administrative procedures, "create reasonable classifications and eligibility
requirements in order to allocate the limited funds available.."" Id. (citing Ruiz at 230
231).
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Court, had stated in dictum that an agency could "adopt policies to
prioritize its expenditures within the bounds established by
Congress. 16 7 Thus, according to the UARG majority, Ruiz merely stood
for the proposition that although an agency confronting resource
constraints could change its own conduct, it could not re-write the law
by changing the "unambiguous requirements imposed by a federal
statute., 168 To do otherwise, the Court held, "would deal a severe blow
to the Constitution's separation of powers., 169 Although the Executive
branch's power extends to resolving certain questions that Congress did
not address when it promulgated the statute in question, the Court made
clear that such power does not include the authority to re-write the
statute when following unambiguous terms are not practical in the
170
agency's view.
In concluding its analysis on why it was incorrect for EPA to
"tailor" the CAA's thresholds, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
briefly responded in a footnote to Justice Breyer's (and 3 other Justice's)
dissenting view on this issue. 17 1 He first challenged Justice Breyer's
view that EPA was allowed to "read an unwritten exception" into "the
particular number used by the statute" in circumstances where the
statute had not given a "sensible regulatory line. 172 Finding "no
principle of administrative law that would allow an agency to rewrite
such a clear statutory term," he dramatized such a view by "shudder[ing]
to contemplate the effect that such a principle would have on democratic
governance. ,,173
Next, Justice Scalia addressed Justice Breyer's argument that there
should be "no difference between (a) reading the statute to exclude
greenhouse gases from the term "any air pollutant" in the permitting

Id.(emphasis in original). See Id. at 22 (citing Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U. S. 182, 192
193 (1993)).
168
Id. at 22.
169
Id. at 22.
170
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, at 23 (citing Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 462 (2002) (agency
lacked authority "to develop new guidelines or to assign liability in a manner
inconsistent with" an "unambiguous statute")).
171 Id. at 24 n.8. See UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268,
12 1269, 12 1272, Opinion of Breyer, J. (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
172 Id. at 24 n.8 (quoting Opinion of Breyer, J. at 10).
173 Id.
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triggers, and (b) reading the statute to exclude sources emitting less than
100,000 tons per year from the statutory phrase "any... source with the
' 174
potential to emit two hundred and fifty tons per year or more. ,,
Justice Scalia explained that, unlike the "specific, numerical
permitting thresholds" found in the PSD and Title V triggers, the
statutory context demonstrate that the term "air pollutant" is subject to
interpretation as to which of the "full range of pollutants" should be
encompassed within those programs. 175 Therefore, although EPA
retains some discretion to reasonably define "air pollutant" within
certain programs of the CAA, there was "no176room for EPA to exercise
discretion in selecting a different threshold.
2. Whether sources that are regulated already because of other
regulated pollutants ("anyway sources") must install Best
Available Control Technology for their GHG emissions
In Part II-B of the Court's opinion, Justice Scalia addressed
"anyway sources," i.e., those sources that require permits based on their
emissions of more conventional pollutants (like particulate matter or
ozone). 177 More specifically, he analyzed "whether EPA reasonably
interpreted the Act to require those sources to comply with "best
available control technology" emission standards for greenhouse
gases.

' 17 8

In Part II-B-1, which was joined again by Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Kennedy, and Justices Thomas and Alito, 179 Justice Scalia first
defined the key PSD requirement that a source needs to be "subject to
the best available control technology" for "each pollutant subject to
regulation under [the Act]" that emitted. 180 After defining BACT, he
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, See Breyer, at 7.
175
Id. at 24 n.8.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 25.
178
Id.
179
Id. (Opinion of Alito, J. at 8 n.3 (stating that "[w]hile I do not think that BACT
174

applies at all to "anyway sources," if it is to apply, the limitations suggested in Part II
B 1 might lessen the inconsistencies highlighted in Part 11 of this opinion, and on that
understanding Ijoin Part IIB 1")).
180
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272 at 25 (quoting 42 U.S.C.§7475(a)(4)).
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noted that BACT is determined "on a case-by-case basis, taking into
account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other
' 18 1

costs."

Next, the Court surveyed the arguments by the parties that EPA
cannot and should not require BACT for GHG for these "anyway
sources." 182 Some petitioners had argued that BACT is an inappropriate
control strategy for GHGs because BACT typically involves "end-ofstack controls" like catalytic converters or particle collectors. 183 They
had asserted that BACT for GHGs, on the other hand, would focus on
energy use that could result in regulation of "every aspect of a facility's
operation and design," right down to the "light bulbs in the factory
cafeteria."'1 84 The Court then cited to EPA documents that seemed to
support some of these concerns. 185 For example, an EPA guidance
document explained that in its early years of the BACT development for
GHGs, the "foundation" of BACT would involve mandatory
improvements in energy efficiency. 186 But the Court noted that the
BACT analysis would later include more traditional controls such as
"carbon capture and storage" which is "reasonably comparable to more
traditional, end-of-stack BACT technologies. 18 7
The Court, however, recognized that there were limits on BACT
that could help blunt an attempt by a permitting authority from reaching
too far in mandating certain energy efficiency improvements. 18 For
Id. at 25 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §7479(3)).
Id.
183
Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner Energy-Intensive Manufacturers Working Group
on Greenhouse Gas Regulation et al. in No. 12 1254, p. 7.
184
Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner Energy-Intensive Manufacturers Working Group
on Greenhouse Gas Regulation et al. in No. 12 1254, p. 7. See also Joint Reply Brief
for Petitioners in No. 12 1248 etc., pp. 14 15 ("BACT for [greenhouse gases] becomes
an unbounded exercise in command-and-control regulation" of everything from
"efficient light bulbs" to "basic industrial processes").
181
182

185

Id. at 26.

186

UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12

1272 at 26 (citing EPA's PSD and Title V Permitting Guidance for Greenhouse Gases
29 (Mar. 2011) (hereinafter Guidance). Id. (citing Peloso & Dobbins, Greenhouse Gas
PSD Permitting: The Year in Review, 42 Tex. Env. L. J. 233, 247 (2012) ("Because
[other controls] tend to prove infeasible, energy efficiency measures dominate the
[greenhouse-gas] BACT controls approved by the states and EPA")).
187
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272
at 26 (citing Guidance 29, 32, 35 36, 42-43). See also Guidance at 32, n. 86.
188 Id.
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' '1 9
instance, because BACT applies to a source's "proposed facility, 8
BACT cannot mandate that a source redesign its facility. 190 Likewise,
since BACT is required only for pollutants that the source itself emits,
the Court pointed out that EPA had explained that "reductions in a
facility's demand for energy from the electric grid" cannot be mandated
as BACT. 191 Finally, the Court cited to an EPA's Guidance Document,
which intimates that every minimal savings in energy efficiency should
not be mandated as BACT. 192 Instead, it had stressed that the key
consideration was "whether a proposed regulatory burden outweighs any
reduction in emissions to be achieved, and should concentrate on the
93
facility's equipment that uses the largest amounts of energy.,
Following these introductory materials on BACT, Justice Scalia
turned to the pivotal question addressed in Part II-B on "whether EPA's
decision to require BACT for greenhouse gases emitted by sources
otherwise subject to PSD review is, as a general matter, a permissible
interpretation of the statute under Chevron. 19 4 Justice Scalia, writing
for a majority of the Court, found that it was permissible to regulate
these "anyway sources." 195 However, unlike the previous sections, his
holding was not joined by Justices Alito and Thomas. 196 Rather, Justice
Scalia (and Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy) were joined by
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor to form a 7-2 decision
197
on this issue.
In his majority opinion on this issue, Justice Scalia first
distinguished the text of the BACT provision from the text of the PSD
and Title V permitting triggering provisions. 198 Under the plain
language of the BACT provision, BACT is required "for each pollutant
189 Id. (citing 42
190

U.S.C. §7475(a)(4)).
Id. (citing Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F. 3d 653, 654 655 (CA7 2007) and In re

Pennsauken City, N. J., Resource Recovery Facility, 2 E. A. D. 667, 673 (EAB 1988)).
191
Id. at 27 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 51947 (1979) and Guidance at 24).
192 Id. at 26 (citing Guidance at 31).
193

at 27.

194

UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272

at 27. Chevron U S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837
(1984).
195
Id.
196 Id. See Opinion of Justice Alito, at 8 (only dissenting from Part II-B-2).
197
Id. See Opinion of Breyer, J., at 2. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and
Sotomayor dissented from the Court's holding as to "non-anyway sources ". Id. at 12.
198
Id.
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subject to regulation under [the Clean Air Act]." 1 99 This, Justice Scalia
asserted, was "far less open-ended than the text of the PSD and Title V
permitting triggers," which decades ago the D. C. Circuit20 0 had found
"would not seem readily susceptible [of] misinterpretation.,
He then repeated the broad scope that the term "any air pollutant"
in the PSD and Title V permit triggering provisions could take. 20 1 This,
he asserted, demonstrated that Congress had envisioned that EPA would
be called upon to clarify the precise pollutants that should be covered by
each regulatory program.20 2 On the other hand, he explained that the
more precise phrase, "each pollutant subject to regulation under this
chapter," provided in the BACT provision showed that Congress had
expressed its intent, leaving much less room for EPA to interpret the
contours of the program. 20 3 And unlike the term "air pollutant," the
term "each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter" had always
been given a consistent meaning by both Congress and by EPA.20 4
Next, Justice Scalia explained that, even if the text of the provision
did not compel his interpretation, there was no practical problem in
applying BACT to GHGs that would render EPA's interpretation
unreasonable.20 5 In other words, applying BACT would not be "so
disastrously unworkable," so as to "result in such a dramatic expansion
of agency authority" or "extend EPA's jurisdiction over millions of
previously unregulated entities. ' ,2 06 Thus, he was not convinced that
BACT was "incapable of being sensibly applied to greenhouse
'20 7

gases.

He then ended Part I-B by stressing that the Court's holding on this
issue was narrow: nothing in the statute categorically prohibits EPA
from interpreting the BACT provision to apply to greenhouse gases

199
200

Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(4)).
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12

1272 at 27 (citing Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F. 2d 323, 404 (1979)).
201
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272 at 27 (emphasis added).
202

Id. at 27.

203
204

Id.
Id. at 28.

205

Id.

206

Id.
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12

207

1272 at 28.
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emitted by "anyway sources., 20 8 Furthermore, he made clear that EPA
would also have to limit the coverage of these "anyway sources" by
establishing a de minimis level under which a source would not have to
install BACT for GHGs.2 °9
In addressing this issue, Justice Scalia also, in a footnote, addressed
Justice Alito's argument that BACT is "fundamentally incompatible"
with GHG emissions. 210 He challenged Justice Alito's conclusion that
because the BACT analysis must take into account the ambient air
quality in the area surrounding a particular source (which was
impossible to do for GHG emissions), GHGs should never be subject to
BACT.2 11 Justice Scalia countered that was no reason to find that GHGs
"must be categorically excluded from BACT" just because one aspect of
the BACT analysis did not work for GHGs.212
Next, he took on Justice Alito's view that EPA's Guidance
Documents for GHG BACT represented "arbitrary and inconsistent
decision making., 2 13 He first noted that the Guidance was not being
subject to judicial review in the case and, simply stated, it was
conceivable that EPA and state permitting authorities could figure out a
lawful way to comply with the CAA requirement that BACT analysis be
performed "on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
energy,
2 14
environmental, and economic impacts and other costs.
Finally, Justice Scalia concluded the Court's opinion by
"sum[ming] up." 215 First, the Court (in a 5-4 decision) found that "EPA
208

UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272

at 28.
Id. at 28-29. The Court noted that under the Tailoring Rule EPA had required
BACT for sources that emit more than 75,000 tons per year CO 2e. Id.. at 28. This
amount, however, was not intended to be a de minimis level. Id. Accordingly, the
Court found that EPA retained authority to set a de minimis level in the future and the
Court's finding that the Tailoring Rule was impressible was not based on the Court
belief that 75,000 tons per year CO 2e exceeded a permissible de minimis level. Id at 2829.
209

210

Id. at 29.

211

Id. See UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269,

12 1272, Opinion of Alito, J. at 4-5.
212
Id. See UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269,
12 1272, Opinion of Alito, J. at 4-5.
213
See UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, Opinion of Alito, J. at 8.
214
Id. at 29 (quoting §7479(3)).
215
Id.
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exceeded its statutory authority when it interpreted the Clean Air Act to
require PSD and Title V permitting for stationary sources based [only]
on their greenhouse-gas emissions" (i.e., "non-anyway sources").2 16
Thus, it prohibited EPA from looking at GHG emissions to determine
whether a source is a "major emitting facility" (or undergoes a
,modification" in the PSD context) or whether a source qualifies as a
"major source" in the Title V context. 2 17 Second, it held (in a 7-2
decision) that it was permissible for EPA to regard GHGs as a "pollutant
subject to regulation under this chapter" for purposes of mandating
BACT for "anyway sources., 218 Accordingly, Justice Scalia, affirmed
219
in part and reversed in part the decision by the D.C. Circuit.
B.

JUSTICEBREYER 'S OPINION

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
concurred in part and dissented in part from Justice Scalia's Opinion for
the Court.220 They agreed with Justice Scalia (who had been joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy) that "anyway sources" (i.e.,
stationary sources that were already subject to the PSD provisions based
on their emissions of non-GHGs pollutant that exceed the PSD trigger)
were subject to BACT for their GHG emissions. 221222Therefore, these
Justices joined Part II-B-2 of Justice Scalia's Opinion.
They disagreed, however, with Justice Scalia's conclusion in Part
II-A that EPA was prohibited from interpreting the CAA to require
sources that emit more than 100,000 tpy CO 2e of GHGs to obtain
permits under the PSD and Title V programs.22 3 Accordingly, Justices

216

Id.

217

Id.

218

Id.

219 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, Opinion ofAlito, J. at 8.
220

UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12

1272, Opinion of Breyer, J. at 2.
221 Id., Opinion ofBreyer, J. at 11-12. See 42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(4) (2013).
222 Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 12.
223 Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 12 ("But as for the Court's holding that EPA
cannot interpret the language at issue here to cover facilities that emit more than
100,000 tpy of greenhouse gases by virtue of those emissions, I respectfully dissent.").
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Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented from this holding
for "non-anyway sources," resulting in a 5-4 decision on this issue.224
Justice Breyer first focused on the Court's opinion in
Massachusetts v. EPA to support his view that sources should be subject
to the PSD and Title V permitting requirements solely on their
emissions of GHGs above the new threshold set by EPA in the Tailoring
Rule. 225 He noted how the Court had held in Massachusetts that GHGs
could be regarded as an "air pollutant" under the CAA's general
definition.2 26 He then challenged the majority opinion's conclusion that
GHGs, although being "air pollutants" under the CAA's general
definition, do not also fall within the definition of "any air pollutant"
under the more specific provisions of the PSD and Title V permitting
programs. 227
After summarizing the PSD and Title V provisions at issue, Justice
Breyer honed in onto the key provision at issue that the PSD program
applies to "any stationary source that has the potential to emit two
hundred fifty tons per year or more of any air pollutant., 22 8 In his view,
however, the "interpretive difficulty" was not in determining whether
GHGs fit within the definition of "any air pollutant., 229 Rather, it was
the provision's use of the termi "two hundred fifty tons per year or more"
(which he called the "250 tpy threshold").230 Justice Breyer conceded
that, as the majority opinion had explained, that the 250 tpy threshold is
too easy to trigger when dealing with GHG emissions. 231 Therefore, as
a practical matter, adhering to this low threshold would result in tens of
thousands of sources triggering the provisions, regulating in an
"extremely expensive and burdensome, counterproductive, and perhaps

224 Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 12. As described, supra, Justice Alito and Justice

Thomas joined Justice Scalia's opinion, except for Part II.B.2. Opinion of Alito, J. at 8.
225 Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 2. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U. S. 497
(2007)).
226
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272
Opinion of Breyer, J. at 2 (citing 42 U. S. C. §7602(g) and Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U. S. 497, 528 529 (2007)).
227
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J.at 2 (citing Slip Op. at 10 24). Although Justice
Breyer only addressed the PSD program throughout his opinion, he did so only "[t]o
simplify the exposition" because "a parallel analysis applies to Title V." Id. at 3.
228 Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 2-3.
229
Id., Opinion ofBreyer, J.at 3-4.
230 Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 3.
231 Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 4.
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impossible" endeavor for the parties involved. 2 And with respect to
the CAA's design, he admitted, too, that it would also contravene
congressional intent in having PSD only apply to large sources "whose
23 3
emissions are substantial enough to justify the regulatory burdens.,
In his view, however, EPA had taken a permissible, and inherently
reasonable, response to these significant concerns when it promulgated
the Tailoring Rule. 4 By raising the trigger for GHGs emissions from
250 tpy to 100,000 tpy, EPA had effectively limited the PSD program to
"a relatively small number of large industrial sources. 23 5 Justice Breyer
also recognized that although the Tailoring Rule cured the practical
concerns posed by the statutory threshold, the Rule had effectively rewritten the statute. 6 He mused:
What is to be done? How, given the statute's language, can the
EPA exempt from regulation sources that emit more than 250 but less
than 100,000 tpy of greenhouse gases (and that also do not emit other
237
regulated pollutants at threshold levels)?
To arrive at his answer, he first summarized the majority's analysis
as having found that the statute did not mandate that GHGs fall within
the PSD trigger of "any air pollutant" and that it had essentially found
an "implicit exception" into the provision because of the absurd results
that would follow from their inclusion.2 3 8 He characterized the Court as
having rewritten the definition of "major emitting facility" to now cover
"stationary sources that have the potential to emit two hundred fifty tons
per year or more of any air pollutant except for those airpollutants, such
as carbon dioxide, with respect to which regulation at that threshold
would be impracticalor absurd or would sweep in smaller sources that
239
Congress did not mean to cover."
232

UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272

Opinion of Breyer, J. at 4. See Slip Op. at 17 20, and n. 7.
233 Id., Opinion ofBreyer, J. at 4.
234
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 4.
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 4 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 31514, 31555 (2010) and id.
at 31523 31524).
236 Id., Opinion ofBreyer, J. at 4.
237
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 4.
238 UARG v.EPA, Nos. 121146, 121248, 121254, 121268, 121269, 12
235

1272, Opinion of Breyer, J. at 4.
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 4-5 (emphasis in original); See id. (citing Opinion
of the Court at 15 16 that "[T]here is no insuperable textual barrier to EPA's
interpreting 'any air pollutant' in the permitting triggers of PSD and Title V to
encompass only pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to be sensibly
239
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He then proceeded to make clear that he agreed that, as a general
matter, that Congress's use of the word "any" usually does not mean
"any in the universe" and that therefore courts should interpret "any" in
context.24 ° Quoting Judge Learned Hand,24 1 legal philosophers, 242 and
Latin maxims, 243 Justice Breyer showed that he completely understood
that the "law has long recognized that terms such as "any" admit of
unwritten limitations and exceptions. 244 Likewise, he agreed with the
majority where Justice Scalia had noted that not every reference to "air
pollutant" in the CAA should be construed as taking on the allencompassing meaning as interpreted by the Massachusetts Court.245
However, Justice Breyer challenged the Court's decision to fashion
an "atextual" exception in the phrase "any air pollutant" by excluding
GHGs from that phrase.246 He noted that Congress had also used the
word "any" in the PSD definition of the term "major emitting
facility. '247 That term, he pointed out, was defined as "any ... source
regulated at the statutory thresholds, and to exclude those atypical pollutants that, like
greenhouse gases, are emitted in such vast quantities that their inclusion would radically
transform those programs and render them unworkable as written").
240
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 5 (citing FCC v. NextWave Personal
Communications Inc., 537 U. S. 293, 311 (2003) (BREYER, J., dissenting) (" 'Tell all
customers that . . .' does not refer to every customer of every business in the world")).
241
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 5 ("[w]e can best reach the meaning here, as
always, by recourse to the underlying purpose, and, with that as a guide, by trying to
project upon the specific occasion how we think persons, actuated by such a purpose,
would have dealt with it, if it had been presented to them at the time." Borella v.
Borden Co., 145 F. 2d 63, 64 (CA2 1944)).
242
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 6 (" '[w]hoever shall willfully take the life of
another shall be punished by death' " need not encompass a man who kills in selfdefense; nor must an ordinance imposing fines upon those who occupy a public parking
spot for more than two hours penalize a driver who is unable to move because of a
parade. See Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 616, 619,
624 (1949)").
243
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 5 ("The maxim cessante ratione legis cessat ipse
lex where a law's rationale ceases to apply, so does the law itself-is not of recent
origin." citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 699 (2001) (citing 1 E. Coke,
Institutes *70b); Green v. Liter, 8 Cranch 229, 249 (1814) (Story, J.) ("cessante ratione,
cessat ipsa lex")).
244
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, Opinion of Breyer, J. at 6.
245
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 6 (citing Slip Op. at 12-13 and 42 U.S.C.
§7602(g)).
246
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 6-7.
247
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 7 (citing 42 U.S.C. §7479(1)).
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with the potential to emit two hundred and fifty tons per year or more of
248
any air pollutant.,
And, in his view, this appearance of the word "any" was the more
appropriate place to carve an exception to the word's plain language. 249
Accordingly, in order to avoid the absurd results that would follow from
GHG emissions triggering the PSD permitting program, an implicit
exception for GHGs should be read25into
the phrase "any source" rather
0
pollutant."
air
"any
phrase
than the
To him, shifting the "location of the exception" by "finding
flexibility in 'any source' [was] far more sensible than the Court's route
of finding it in 'any air pollutant.' 251 In other words, he proposed to
change the definition of "major emitting facility" by implicitly
excluding sources "emitting unmanageably small amounts of
greenhouse gases, with respect to which regulation at that threshold
would be impractical or absurd or52would sweep in smaller sources that
2
Congress did not mean to cover.,
Such an interpretation, in his view, would result in a "real-world
253
purpose" from "a legal, administrative, and functional perspective.
First, he found that his interpretation would effectuate Congress's
intended goal of specifying a 250 tpy statutory threshold, which was "to
limit the PSD program's obligations to larger sources while exempting
the many small sources whose emissions are low enough that imposing
burdensome regulatory requirements on them would be senseless. 2 54
He cited a Senate Report and a statement made by Senator Edmund
Muskie, one of the prime architects of these provisions, to support the
view that the PSD program would not cover "houses, dairies, farms,
highways, hospitals, schools, grocery stores, and other such sources." 2 55
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 7 (citing 42 U.S.C. §7479(1)) (emphasis to
provision added by Breyer, J.).
249
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 7.
250 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
248

1272, Opinion of Breyer, J. at 7.
251
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, Opinion of Breyer, J. at 7.
252
Id., Opinion ofBreyer, J. at 7.
253
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 7-8.
254
255

Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 8.
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 8 (quoting 123 Cong. Rec. 18013, 18021 (1977));
id. (PSD program "is reasonable and necessary for very large sources, such as new
electrical generating plants or new steel mills. But the procedure would prove costly
and potentially unreasonable if imposed on construction of storage facilities for a small
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He also applauded EPA for similarly recognizing that Congress
enacted the 100/250 tpy threshold in order to target the large industrial
sources.256 EPA had stated that Congress wanted to focus on these
sources because they were not only the primary cause of the pollution
problems at the time, but also could shoulder the significant burden in
257
complying with the program.
Although Justice Breyer conceded that the Court's holding had also
effectively limited the PSD program along these same lines, he
maintained that the Court's interpretation of the phrase "any air
pollutant," went much further than this goal. 258 He opined that the
Court's decision effectively had allowed dangerous air pollutants to go
unregulated just because such pollutants might not be able to be
practically regulated at the statutory thresholds. 259 He found "[n]othing
in the statutory text, the legislative history, or common sense" that
supported the view that the PSD triggers should be construed in a way
that would undercut Congress's expansive definition of "any air
pollutant" in the PSD program. 260 Removing substances, rather than
facilities from the PSD program was simply not the prudent method for
correcting any practical problem with the application of the 250 tpy
threshold.261 Thus, he declared his "source-related exception would
262
address any concern with the threshold while going no further.,
It would also reinforce the flexibility that Congress envisioned for
the CAA.2 63
Citing the Court's opinion in Massachusetts, he
highlighted how Congress wanted to ensure that EPA had the authority
to adjust to scientific developments and changing circumstances in order
gasoline jobber or on the construction of a new heating plant at a junior college." S.
Rep. No. 95 127, p. 96 (1977)).
256 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12

1272, Opinion of Breyer, J. at 8-9.
257
258

Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 8-9.

261

Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 9.
UARG v.EPA,Nos. 121146, 121248, 121254, 121268, 121269, 12

Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 9 (quoting Slip Op. at 18: the "Court similarly
acknowledges that "the PSD program and Title V are designed to apply to, and cannot
rationally be extended beyond, a relative handful of large sources capable of
shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens.").
259
Id., Opinion ofBreyer, J.
at 6-7.
260 Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 9.
262

1272, Opinion of Breyer, J. at 9.
263

UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12

1272, Opinion of Breyer, J. at 9-10.
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to prevent the CAA from becoming obsolete. 264 The majority's
decision, he asserted, eroded this authority by denying EPA the ability
to reach the large sources that Congress intended to be covered simply
on the basis that a newly recognized pollutant (namely carbon dioxide)
did not suit the thresholds that Congress established years ago.265
To him, tethering the exception to the scope of the term "any
source" would also preserve the more important phrase in the statutory
definition (i.e., "any air pollutant") as opposed to the numerical
threshold that applies to any and all pollutants.26 6 This, too, he asserted
would preserve EPA's discretion to address matters that concern the
orderly administration of the CAA, as well as when EPA reasonably
determined that regulating a new 7 pollutant would result in an
26
impermissible expansion of the CAA.
Justice Breyer's last point was that his interpretation would better
effectuate the very purpose of the CAA, which is "to protect and
enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the
public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its
population., 268 Once EPA determined in its Endangerment Finding that
GHGs emissions from motor-vehicles endanger human health and
welfare, he believed that it was "at the core of the purpose" of the CAA
for EPA to then regulate and control industrial emissions of GHGs.2 69
He concluded as his opinion that because the Court's over-reaching (and
unnecessary) "no greenhouse gases" exception subverts the CAA's

264 Id., Opinion of Breyer, I at 9-10 (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U. S., at 532).

See also id. (recognizing in Massachusettsthat "[t]he broad language of' the Act-wide
definition of "air pollutant" "reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility
necessary to forestall such obsolescence").
265 Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 10.
266 Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 10.
267 Id., Opinion of Breyer, I at 10-11 (citing Barnhart
v. Walton, 535 U. S. 212,
222 (2002) (enumerating factors that we take to indicate that Congress intends the
agency to exercise the discretion provided by Chevron)).
268 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, Opinion of Breyer, J. at 11 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §7401(b)(1), and citing §7470(1)
(2013) (A purpose of the PSD program in particular is "to protect public health and
welfare from any actual or potential adverse effect which in the Administrator's
judgment may reasonably be anticipate[d] to occur from air pollution") and §7602(h)
("All language [in the Act] referring to effects on welfare includes ...effects on ...
weather ... and climate")).
269 Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 11.
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purpose, he dissented from the Court's holding that EPA could not tailor
the PSD program to reach these larger sources.
C.

JUSTICEALITO 'S OPINION

Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in part and
dissented in part from Justice Scalia's Opinion. 1 Specifically, the pair
agreed with Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Kennedy
that EPA could not require "non-anyway sources" to secure PSD or
Title V permits on the sole basis of the its potential GHG emissions. 272
This formed a 5-4 decision on this issue. 3
As to "anyway sources," however, Justice Alito and Justice
Thomas dissented from Part II-B-2 where the Court had found that
"anyway sources" were required to obtain PSD permits and use BACT
for their GHG emissions.2 74 But in order to "lessen the inconsistencies"
that requiring BACT would cause, they endorsed the limitations
suggested by Justice Scalia in Part II-B-I and "on that understanding"
they specifically joined Part I-B- 1.27 5
Simply stated, the fundamental thrust of Justice Alito's opinion was
that Massachusetts v. EPA was wrongly decided.27 6 In his view, the
Court should have heeded EPA's admission at that time that "key
provisions of the [Act] cannot cogently be applied to [greenhouse gas]
emissions." 277 His opinion then proceeded to expose why "these cases
' 27
further expose the flaws with that decision. , 1
In Part I, Justice Alito first very briefly summarized that he agreed
with the Court's conclusion on "non-anyway sources" (and therefore
joined Parts I and II A of the Court's opinion).279 He repeated Justice

270

Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 11-12.

271

Id.,

273

Opinion ofAlito, J. at 2
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 2.
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 2.

274

UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12

272

1272, Opinion ofAlito, J. at 2.
275
Id., Opinion ofAlito, J. at 2, 8 n.3.
276
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 2. Both Justice Alito and Justice Thomas dissented
in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007).
277
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 2 (quoting Brief for Federal Respondent in
Massachusetts v. EPA, 0. T. 2006, No. 05 1120, p. 22).
278

279

Opinion ofAlito, J. at 2.
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 2.
Id.,
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Scalia's view that the only way to avoid absurd results of fitting GHGs
into the CAA's key programs was for EPA to essentially rewrite the
CAA, which EPA could not do. 280 Thus, it was impermissible for EPA
to "cross1 out the figures enacted by Congress and substitute figures of its
' 28

own.

In Part II, Justice Alito discussed why he disagreed with the Court's
decision that "anyway sources," were required to use BACT for their
GHG emissions.28 2 Like the PSD and Title V triggers, he asserted that
fitting GHGs into the BACT analysis "badly distorts" Congress's
regulatory scheme under the CAA.28 3 He rejected both the textual and
practical justifications offered by the Court. 4
First, with respect to the textual analysis, Justice Alito criticized the
Court for being inconsistent. 285 He pointed out that the Court had
rejected a literal interpretation of "pollutant" in Part II A in finding that
GHGs were not pollutants for the purpose of the PSD and Title V
triggers.2 86 But then in Part II B, where the Court had found that
sources would have to apply BACT, he asserted that the Court had
28 7
"turn[ed] on its heels and adopt[ed] a literal interpretation.
He further explained that he agreed with the Court's conclusion in
Part 11-A that "any pollutant" for purposes of the PSD and Title V
triggers actually meant "pollutant, other than a greenhouse gas.,

288

But,

in Justice Alito's view, the Court erred by not carrying this more limited
construction of "any pollutant" over to its Part I-B analysis when it
determined whether GHGs qualified as a pollutant for the purpose of
the BACT requirement.28 9 If it had not gone astray, the Court would
have found that any "pollutant subject to regulation under [the CAA]" in
the BACT provision should also mean "pollutant, other than a

280
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, Opinion of Alito, J. at 2.
281
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 2.
282
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1
268, 12 1269, 12
1272, Opinion of Alito, J. at 3.
283 Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 3.
284
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 3.
285 Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 3.
286
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 3.
287
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 3.

UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1
268, 12 1269, 12
1272, Opinion of Alito, J. at 3.
289
Id., Opinion ofAlito, J. at 3 (citing 42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(4)).
288
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greenhouse gas, subject to regulation under [the Act]., 290 But, of
course, the Court did not so hold, and for this reason Justice Alito called
the Court's literalism analysis "selective," resulting "in a strange and
29 1
disjointed regulatory scheme.
Relatedly, Justice Alito questioned the anomalous result that occurs
with respect to these inconsistent conclusions.29 2 According to the
Court's interpretation in Part II-A, a source (that is not otherwise subject
to the PSD requirements for a different pollutant) can release "an
unlimited quantity of GHGs without triggering the need for a PSD
permit (and installing BACT). 29 3 But if that same source is already
subject to the PSD requirements, it would be required to use BACT
because it is an "anyway source" according to the Court's Part II-B
294
analysis.
Next, in Part II-B of his opinion, Justice Alito outlined why the
"BACT analysis is fundamentally incompatible with the regulation of
greenhouse-gas emissions., 295 First, under the PSD program, he
explained, BACT is aimed to address the localized effects for emissions
of the covered pollutants.2 96 In addition, as a general matter, BACT and
other types of pollution mitigation measures work together "to prevent
significant deterioration of air quality in each region."2 97 To support
this goal, BACT is determined "on a case-by-case basis" taking into
298
account local pollution conditions.

290

UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12

1272, Opinion ofAlito, J. at 3-4 (citing 42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(4)).
Id., Opinion ofAlito, J.at 3.
291
292 Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 4.
293
Id., Opinion ofAlito, J.at 4.
294 Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 4.
295 Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 4.
296 UARG v. EPA,Nos. 121146, 121248, 121254, 121268, 121269, 12
1272, Opinion of Alito, J. at 4.
297 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, Opinion of Alito, J. at 4 (citing 42 U.S.C. §7471) (emphasis added by Justice
Alito).
298
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 5 (citing 42 U.S.C. §7479(3)). See id. (CAA
requires an analysis of "the ambient air quality ... at the site of the proposed major
emitting facility and in the area potentially affected by the emissions from such facility
for each pollutant regulated under [the Act]." §7475(e)(3)(B) (2013) (emphasis added
by Justice Alito)). See also id. (noting that the CAA "also requires a public hearing on
"the air quality at the proposed site and in areas which may be affected by emissions
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Applying these principles, Justice Alito proposed that a BACT
analysis for GHGs would have to include the monitoring of the area, as
well as an assessment of the effect of GHG pollution in and around the
source, among other things. 299 However, this exercise demonstrated
why, in his view, BACT was incompatible with GHG emissions: "The
effects of greenhouse gases, however, are global, not local" 30 0 He
therefore found it unsurprising EPA had declared that PSD permit
applicants and permitting officials could disregard these provisions of
30 1
the Act.
The second incompatibility highlighted by Justice Alito concerned
the CAA requirement that the permitting authority compare and balance
the environmental benefits afforded from a particular pollution control
device with any adverse effects that could result from requiring that
device.30 2 He pointed out that EPA had similarly conceded that this
comparison could not be performed "on a case-by-case basis with
respect to greenhouse gases. 30 3 He then devoted the remainder of his
opinion analyzing in detail why the determination on "a case-by-case
basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts
and other costs" of BACT for GHGs was unworkable.30 4
For instance, he cited EPA's five-step framework that it had
developed to assist permitting authorities to perform the BACT
analysis. 30 5 In order to provide another specific example of why BACT

from such facility for each pollutant subject to regulation under [the Act] which will be
emitted from such facility." §§7475(a)(2), (e)(1) (emphasis added by Justice Alito)).
299 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, Opinion of Alito, J. at 5.
300
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 5 (citing PSD and Title V Permitting Guidance for
Greenhouse Gases 41-42 (Mar. 2011)).
301
Id., Opinion ofAlito, J. at 5 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 31520 (2010)).
302
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 5. These consequences include any negative impact
on the environment, energy conservation, and the economy. See id.
303 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, Opinion of Alito, J. at 5. These consequences include any negative impact on the
environment, energy conservation, and the economy. See id.
304 Id., Opinion ofAlito, J. at 5-8 (citing 422 U.S.C. §7479(3)).
305 Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 5-6 and n. 1 (citing New Source Review Workshop
Manual: Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment Area Permitting
(Oct. 1990)). According to the Manual, the steps are:
(1) The applicant must identify all available control options that are potentially
applicable by consulting EPA's BACT clearinghouse along with other reliable sources.
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was incompatible with GHG regulation, he describes the fourth step of
the framework. °6 Under this step, certain control technologies are
removed from the list of possible candidates because of their "collateral
impacts," including adverse environmental effects or a deleterious
impact on energy consumption or the economy.30 7 In other words, the
"positives" of a particular control measure are to be balanced against the
''negatives."
He pointed out EPA had conceded that it is impossible for a
permitting authority to actually estimate (much less, quantify) any
potential reduction that a source could have on any of these potential
impacts. 30 8 Therefore, a permitting authority cannot compare benefits in
any meaningful way with any adverse impacts from requiring any given
30 9
pollution control device.
Justice Alito also used the example of when a permitting authority
was called upon to determine whether to require a pollution control
measure that would "both decrease a source's emission of greenhouse
gases and increase its emission of a conventional pollutant that has a
negative effect on public health., 310 He then explored "[h]ow should a
permitting authority decide whether to require this change?' 3 11 He
quoted EPA's advice which recommended that a permitting authority
should not "attempt to determine or characterize specific environmental

(2) The technical feasibility of the control options identified in step 1 are eliminated
based on technical infeasibility.
(3) The control technologies are ranked based on control effectiveness, by considering:
the percentage of the pollutant removed; expected emission rate for each new source
review (NSR) pollutant; expected emission reduction for each regulated NSR pollutant;
and output based emissions limit.
(4) Control technologies are eliminated based on collateral impacts, such as: energy
impacts; other environmental impacts; solid or hazardous waste; water discharge from
control device; emissions of air toxics and other non-NSR regulated pollutants; and
economic impacts.
(5) The most effective control option not eliminated in step 4 is proposed as BACT for
the pollutant and emission unit under review.
Id.
306
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 6.
307
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, Opinion ofAlito, J. at 6.
308
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 7.
309
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 7.
310
Id., Opinion ofAlito, J. at 7.
31
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 7-8.
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impacts from GHGs emitted at particular locations," but rather "focus
on the amount of GHG emission reductions that may be gained or lost
by employing a particular control strategy and how that compares to the
environmental or other impacts resulting from the collateral emissions
increase of other regulated NSR pollutants., 312 But these instructions,
he asserted, were futile because without knowing the impact that a
proposed reduction in GHG emissions would have, no actual
comparison could be made.313
Finally, he challenged EPA's suggestion that in making a GHG
BACT determination permitting authorities would be able to rely on the
11
great deal of discretion"
that accompanies these types of decisions. 314
This type of incomprehensible standard, he asserted, was the hallmark of
"arbitrary and inconsistent decision making" and not what the drafters of
the CAA contemplated.3 1 5
Justice Alito concluded his opinion by noting that he did agree with
some the limitations suggested by the Court in Part II B 1.316 These
limitations, he thought, might lessen the inconsistencies that he had
discussed and "on that understanding" he joined Part II B 1 of the
3 17
majority decision.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

Although the precise contours of the Court's decision remain to be
seen, several significant observations can be made with respect to the
impact on the EPA rules at issue in UARG v. EPA, as well as perhaps to
upcoming GHG regulations. This Part thus assesses and analyzes the
implications of the Court's holding, as well as the opinions of Justice
Breyer and Justice Alito.
The most important facet of the Court's opinion was its
reaffirmation of EPA's authority to regulate GHG emissions to address
climate change. This should be considered a significant step forward in
EPA's ability to continue to protect human health and welfare from the
effects of climate change. Next, the Court's decision, of course, directly
312

UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272

Opinion ofAlito, J. at 7-8 (quoting Guidance 42).
313 Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 8.
314
Id., Opinion ofAlito, J. at 8 (citing Guidance 41).
315

36
37

Id., Opinion ofAlito, J. at 8.

Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 8.
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 8.
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impacted EPA's authority to reach various stationary sources of GHG
emissions. On this issue, EPA was dealt a mixed decision that hinged
on whether the source was considered an "anyway source" or "nonanyway source."
The Court's various opinions also set forth broader principles that
will likely have an impact on future EPA actions. For example, the
majority suggested it would be hesitant to allow EPA to seize power not
readily contemplated by Congress when it established the CAA; to
deviate from the statutory provisions of the CAA; and to extend its
authority to require pollution control measure that were too far beyond
ones traditional use currently used under the CAA.
A.

THE COURT RE-AFFIRMEDAND CLARIFIED ITS CORE HOLDING IN

MASSACHUSETTS V EPA.

In deciding the case, the Court declined to re-examine the core
holding in Massachusetts v. EPA that GHGs were "pollutants" under
CAA and therefore could be regulated by EPA to address climate
change.318 The Massachusetts Court had split by a vote of 5-4 on this
issue and although it was unlikely that that the Court would overturn
such a recent decision, commentators noted how the possibility was
there.3 1 9
By a vote of 7-2, however, the UARG Court re-affirmed its holding
that the term "air pollutant" includes "greenhouse gases because it is allencompassing; it 'embraces all airborne compounds of whatever
stripe."' 320 While Justice Alito and Justice Thomas continued to express
their view that Massachusetts v. EPA "was wrongly decided,, 321 Chief

318

UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272

at 11 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 529 (2007), approvingly).
319
See Johnathan Alder, Further thoughts on today's Supreme Court decision on
greenhouse gas regulation (available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/23/furtherthoughts-on-todays-supreme-court-decision-on-greenhouse-gas-regulation/)
(last
visisted Sept. 24, 2014).
320
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272
at 11 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 529 (2007)).
321
Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 2.
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Justice Roberts and Justice 22
Scalia remained faithful to the Court's
3
decisis.
stare
under
precedent
Also of significance is that the Court clarified its holding in
Massachusetts by limiting its scope. It declined to extend its expansive
interpretation of the general definition of "air pollutant" to all instances
where the CAA uses that term in the "operative provisions. ,,323 Thus,
although it is now beyond dispute that EPA, as a general matter, can
regulate GHGs under the CAA, the permissibility of future attempts to
regulate will now depend on which provisions EPA is using.
In sum, this re-affirmation and clarification of EPA's authority to
regulate GHGs to address climate change allows EPA to continue its
current efforts to regulate GHGs emissions, such as for mobile sources
under Title II and for "anyway sources" under the PSD and Title V
programs. 324 Likewise, it clears the way, as a threshold matter, for
future regulatory actions, such as EPA's already pending Clean Power
Plan (CPP) rule.325
B. THE COURT'SAPPROVAL OFEPA 'sAUTHORITY OVER "ANYWAY
SOURCES" IS A SIGNIFICANT STEP To ADDRESS STATIONARY

SOURCE GHG EMISSIONS

Another important aspect of the Court's decision was its holding
that EPA was permitted to mandate that "anyway sources" use BACT to
mitigate their GHG emissions.3 26 In addition, there are several more
nuanced issues that come out of the Court's decision, the significance of
which remain to be seen. For example, because the Court approved of
EPA's authority to require GHG BACT for "anyway sources," some

322 Id. at 11-16 (applying the holding in Massachusetts v. EPA to this case). See
Johnathan Alder, Further thoughts on today's Supreme Court decision on greenhouse
gas regulation (available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/23/furtherthoughts-on-todays-supreme-court-decision-on-greenhouse-gas-regulation/).
323 Id. at 11 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 529 (2007)).
324 42 U.S.C. §7521 (2013); Light Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission
Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule ("Tailpipe
Rule"), 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010).
325 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830 (June 18, 2014).
326 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272
at 27.
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have questioned whether the Court invalidated the Tailoring Rule en
toto.327 However, as a practical matter, it seems clear that the Court
envisioned further work by EPA on remand with respect to delineating
the BACT requirement for GHGs. Accordingly, EPA might retract the
rule or revise it on its own. In addition, although it did approve EPA's
authority to mandate GHG BACT, the Court suggested that EPA's
discretion to mandate BACT was not unlimited.
1. The Court's decision is a significant step in controlling
GHG emissions from stationarysources.
The Court's 7-2 decision on "anyway sources" represents a
significant step in controlling GHG emissions from U.S. industrial
sources. As Justice Scalia pointed out, "anyway sources" addressed in
Part II-B of his Opinion constitute approximately 83% of U.S.
stationary-source GHG emissions. 328
And "non-anyway sources"
addressed in Part II-A, on the other hand, only comprised of 3% of GHG
stationary source emissions. 329 Thus, the sheer magnitude of GHG
emissions that EPA was cleared to regulate under the CAA makes the
Court's decision a significant step forward in address and mitigate the
impacts from climate change.
2. It remains to be seen whether EPA must re-promulgate a
rule for "anyway sources. "
Although the Court's opinion reads like the Court struck down the
Tailoring Rule in its entirety, it appears that parts of the rule remain
valid. 330 As set forth, EPA designed the Tailoring Rule as various

Id. at 28-29. See, e.g., Jonathan Z. Cannon, UARG v. EPA: Is the Tailoring
Rule
All
Dean
or
Just
Part
Dead,
National
Law
Review,
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/
uarg-v-epa-tailoring-rule-all-dead-or-just-partdead (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
328
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272
327

at 29.
329

330

Id. at 29.
Id. at 29 (only invalidating EPA's regulations "[to the extent that they purport

to" interpret the Clean Air Act to require PSD and Title V permitting for stationary
sources based on their greenhouse gas emissions). See, e.g., Jonathan Z. Cannon,
UARG v. EPA: Is the Tailoring Rule All Dean or Just Part Dead, National Law Review,
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"steps" to phase-in the regulation of GHGs.33 1 Step 1 applied to
"anyway sources" (i.e., those sources that were already subject to the
PSD and Title V programs because of their releases of conventional
pollutants).33 2 If these sources had GHG emissions more than 75,000
tpy CO 2e, they were required to install BACT for GHGs.33 3 Step 2, on
the hand, addressed "non-anyway sources," which EPA asserted had to
obtain PSD and Title V permits based solely on its GHG emissions
above 100,000/75,000 tpy CO 2 e.33 4
While it is clear that Step 2 was invalidated because it applied to
"non-anyway sources," the underlying mandate in Step 1 of the
Tailoring Rule appears to remain viable under the Court's decision.
After all, this class of sources was specifically the focus of the Court's
holding in Part II-B, which approved EPA's authority over "anyway
sources." 335 Thus, depending on EPA's view and its policy-choice, it
might not have to engage in an entirely new rulemaking process to
capture "anyway sources" or it could engage in a streamlined process.
Either scenario could result in a significant saving in time in requiring
such source install GHG BACT.
3. EPA still might need to set de minimis level for the BACT
requirement, which may further limit the scope of sources
covered by the program.
Another significant implication of the Court's decision on "anyway
sources" is its language that EPA can only require GHG BACT for those
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/uarg-v-epa-tailoring-rule-all-dead-or-just-partdead (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
331 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,606-08 (June 3, 2010); see also UARG v. EPA,
Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272 at 7-8.
332 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,606-8 (June 3, 2010); see also UARG v. EPA,
Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272 at 7-8.
333 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,606-08 (June 3, 2010); see also UARG v. EPA,
Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272 at 7-8.
334 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,606-08 (June 3, 2010); see also UARG v. EPA,
Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272 at 7-8.
335 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272
at 24-29.
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sources that emit "more than a de minimis amount of greenhouse
gases. 33 6 Although EPA in the Tailoring Rule seemed to be setting a de
minimis level by increasing the trigger to 75,000 tons per year CO 2e, the
Court noted that EPA "did not arrive at that number by identifying [it
as] the de minimis level.33 7 And the Court then specifically stated that
they were not holding that "75,000 tons per year CO 2e necessarily
exceeds a true de minimis level."3'38
The potential impact of this language is significant. Consistent
with the Step 1 requirement, EPA could still maintain that only those
"anyway sources" that emit more than 75,000 tpy CO 2e install BACT,
as long as it grounded its selection of this amount as a de minimis level
(or as an interim level) rather than as regulatory re-writing of the
statute. 339 Not only would this allow EPA to expedite coverage of
"anyway sources," but it also, in effect, could allow EPA to continue to
"tailor" the triggering provision for GHG BACT through the use of a de
minimis level into the future.
4. The Court found that there were limits on EPA's BACT
requirementfor GHGs.
Another significant restraint that the Court placed on EPA's
authority over "anyway sources" involved the selection of the
appropriate BACT for GHGs. 340 The Court "acknowledge[d] the
potential for greenhouse-gas BACT to lead to an unreasonable and
unanticipated degree of regulation., 341 Accordingly, it clarified that its
"decision should not be taken as an endorsement of all aspects of EPA's
current approach, nor as a free rein for any future regulatory application
342
of BACT in this distinct context.,
For example, the Court warned EPA that GHG BACT should not
be grounded in mandating energy efficiency improvements that were not

336

UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272

at 28.
337

Id. at 28-29.

338

Id. at 28-29.

339
34o

Id. at 28-29 (citing Alabama Power, at 405).
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at 28.
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Id. at 25-27.

Id. at 28.
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focused on the proposed source in question.34 3 The Court noted that
BACT must apply to a source's "proposed facility;, 344 EPA cannot
mandate that a source redesign its facility; 345 and EPA cannot mandate
"reductions in a facility's demand for energy from the electric grid" as
BACT.3 46
It is noteworthy that the part of the Court's decision within which
these suggested limitations were found (Part II-B-1) was not joined by
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, or Kagan. 347 Although they
joined Part II-B-2, which was the Court's holding on this issue, these
Justices presumably did not agree that EPA should be constrained along
the lines listed by Justice Scalia in section 1.348
Part II-B-1, however, did become the majority view of the Court
because Justice Alito and Justice Thomas joined this part.349 This was a
curious move because they had dissented from the core holding in Part
II-B-2, where the Court had held BACT could be required of "anyway
sources." 350 Justice Alito, however, explained his rationale by stating
that though the limitations might lessen the inconsistencies of requiring
a GHG BACT, "on that understanding," he would join Part IIB 1.351
Thus, parties will likely be able to use this language as constituting the
view of the majority of the Court during the GHG BACT process to help
mitigate permitting agencies from reaching too far.
C

THE COURT'S DECISIONON "NON-ANYWAY SOURCES" WILL

GREATL YREDUCE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENAND COSTS To
SMALLER SOURCES

343
344
345

Id. at 26.
Id. at 26 (citing 42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(4)).
Id. at 26 (citing Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F. 3d 653, 654 655 (CA7 2007) and
In re Pennsauken City., N. J., Resource Recovery Facility, 2 E. A. D. 667, 673 (EAB

1988)).
346
Id. at 27 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 51947 (1979) and Guidance at 24).
347 UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269,
12

1272, Opinion of Breyer, J. at 12 (joining only Part II B 2 of the Court's opinion in
Part II).
348
Id., Opinion of Breyer, J. at 12 (joining only Part IIB 2 of the Court's opinion
in Part II).
349
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12
1272, Opinion of Alito, J. at 2.
350
Id., Opinion ofAlito, J. at 2.
351

Id., Opinion of Alito, J. at 2.
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The Court's decision that sources cannot trigger the PSD and Title
V permitting requirements solely on the basis of their GHG emissions
(i.e., "non-anyway sources") was extremely significant because it will
unquestionably result in administrative and regulatory relief. The
burden on both permitting authorities and sources were not in real
dispute. Thus, it is straight-forward to predict the dramatic impact the
Court's decision will have on this issue.
For example, as EPA had set forth in the Tailoring Rule,
applications for PSD permit were expected to rise from approximately
800 to about 82,000 each year;3 5 2 administrative costs of the PSD
program would have risen from $12 million to over $1.5 billion,35 3 and
35 4
"decade-long delays" in the issuance of permits could have resulted.
Similarly, the Title V program would have faced an overwhelming wave
of permit applications: over 6 million sources (up from about 15,000
sources) would need permits; administrative costs would have leaped
from $62 million to $21 billion annually,35 5 and the permitting costs for
the new source were estimated to cost a total of $147 billion.3 5 6 The
decision therefore eliminates these burdens.
D.

THE COURT WILL BE SKEPTICAL OFAGENCYACTION THAT
SIGNIFICANTLYEXPANDS ANA GENCY 'S REGULATORYA UTHORITY

Following the UARG decision, the Court will scrutinize future
attempts by agencies, such as EPA, to expand their regulatory authority
beyond their historic limits.
One reason for rejecting EPA's
interpretation concerning the PSD and Title V triggers was because it
"would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA's
regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization. 3 5 7 And
the Court indicated that this skepticism will be especially high when an
agency's interpretation impacts "a significant portion of the American

Id. at 17(citing Tailoring Rule 31557).
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272
at 17 (citing Tailoring Rule 31557).
354
Id. at 17 (citing Tailoring Rule 31557).
355
Id. at 17 (citing Tailoring Rule at 31562 31563).
356
Id. at 17 (citing Tailoring Rule at 31562 31563).
357
Id. at 19.
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economy. ' , 358 Thus, future actions will likely be assessed under this
benchmark.3 59
E. THE COURT REINFORCED THE ADMINISTRATIVE LA WPRINCIPLE
THATA GENCIES CAAWOT RE- WRITE STATUTORYLANGUAGE.

Finally, the Court's decision will certainly be used in future cases
where agencies, like EPA, are interpreting statutory provisions.
Although recognizing that judicial review was deferential, the Court
faulted EPA for re-writing statutory language.3 6 ° In making its holding,
the Court thus "reaffirm[ed] the core administrative-law principle that
an agency may not rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of
how the statute should operate., 361 The Court stressed that "[a]gencies
exercise discretion only in the interstices created by statutory silence or
ambiguity; they must always "'give effect to the unambiguously

Id. at 19 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 159). See also MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218,
231 (1994); Industrial Union Dept., AFL CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.
S.607, 645 646 (1980) (plurality opinion).
359 Although it is beyond the scope of this article, it is also possible
that the
Court's decision could impact EPA's forthcoming Clean Power Plan (CPP) rule. The
potential impact is sheer speculation at this point since EPA has not released its final
rule. Nonetheless, several early observations may be made. The draft rule, called the
Clean Power Plan rule, proposes to regulate GHG emissions from power plants by
establishing New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for power plants Under CAA
section 111.
As discussed above, there is no question that EPA can, as a threshold matter, move
forward with the rule under its authority to regulate GHGs as pollutants subject to
regulation under the CAA. But it remains to be seen whether the language used by the
Court in the UARG decision suggests that the Court will invalidate the specific methods
by which EPA currently plans to effectuate its CPP. The pivotal inquiry will be
whether these GHG NSPS constitute a "transformative expansion" EPA's regulatory
authority. See Seth D. Jaffe, GHG regulations: A Cautionary Tale,
http://www.fierceenergy.com/story/ghg-regulations-cautionary-tale/2014-07-22
(last
visited October 15, 2014).
360
UARG v. EPA, Nos. 12 1146, 12 1248, 12 1254, 12 1268, 12 1269, 12 1272
at 21 (quoting National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U. S.
644, 665 (2007) (quoting Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843)).
361 Id. at 20 (quoting Arlington, 569 U. S., at
(slip op., at 5) (internal
quotations deleted)).
358

EARTH JURISPRUDENCEAND
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

expressed intent of Congress.' 362 Therefore the Court found that "[a]n
agency has no power to "tailor" legislation to bureaucratic policy goals
363
by rewriting unambiguous statutory terms.
CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in UARG v.EPA represents an important step
in developing comprehensive GHG regulation. Although EPA could
not claim a complete victory, there is no question that EPA can now
reach a significant amount of industrial GHG emissions. Moreover, the
reaffirmation of core principles in Massachusetts v. EPA is significant.
Even though the Court did cabin EPA's authority with respect to "nonanyway sources," as well as possibly limit the selection of BACT for
GHGs, the stage remains clear for EPA to regulate GHGs from motorvehicles, to move ahead with GHG regulation for "anyway sources,"
and to promulgate a final rule regulating GHG emissions from power
plants.

362

Id. at 21 (quoting National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,

551 U. S. 644, 665 (2007) (quoting Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843)).
363
Id. at 21 (quoting National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,
551 U. S. 644, 665 (2007) (quoting Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843)).

